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All of the significant symbols of American kinship are contained
within the figure of sexual intercourse, itself a symbol, of course.
—David Schneider, American Kinship: A Cultural Account1
I. INTRODUCTION
People are procreating non-sexually more than ever before.2 The
use of the “new reproduction”—a term that comprises alternative re-
productive technologies (ARTs) like alternative insemination, in vitro
fertilization, and surrogacy3—to reproduce has exploded4 in the
United States since the federal government first started collecting sta-
tistics on alternative reproduction in 1992,5 with the numbers of both
ART cycles and babies born from those cycles increasing over one hun-
dred percent in the last two decades.6 In fact, some commentators pre-
dict that emerging ARTs will soon create a situation where much, if
not most, human procreation will occur without sex.7 The boldest
1. DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 40 (1968)
[hereinafter SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP]; see also id. at 40–41 (“Sexual
intercourse is the symbol which provides the distinctive features or the elements
in terms of which the family is defined.”); David M. Schneider, Kinship and
Biology, in ANSLEY J. COALE ET AL., ASPECTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF FAMILY
STRUCTURE 83, 97 (1965) ([T]here is not a kinship system known to man that does
not get involved in one way or another with . . . sexual intercourse.”).
2. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2286
(2017) [hereinafter NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood] (citing statistics indicat-
ing that “[t]he use of [alternative reproductive technology] soared in the first part
of the twenty-first century”). Even as this Article makes a distinction between
“sexual” and “non-sexual” reproduction, it recognizes that sometimes these two
forms of procreation overlap. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Reproduction Recon-
ceived, 101 MINN. L. REV. 617, 656–71 (2016) [hereinafter Cahill, Reproduction
Reconceived].
3. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935
(1996) (referring to alternative reproductive technologies as the “new
reproduction”).
4. JUDITH DAAR, THE NEW EUGENICS: SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 14 (2017).
5. Id. at 10.
6. Id. at 14. Note that the true number of ART cycles is considerably higher than
this statistic given that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
which collects statistics on alternative reproduction, does not collect data on arti-
ficial insemination, just on in vitro fertilization. Id. at 15.
7. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Selective Procreation in Public and Private Law, 64 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 294, 298–99 (2016) (arguing that “[t]he decades ahead are likely
to see advances” in reproductive medicine and choice that “promise opportuni-
ties” for prospective parents “to relocate procreation from the bedroom to the lab-
oratory.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and
Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian Ethos, 33 AM. J.L. &
MED. 567, 567–68 (2007) (making the same prediction); HENRY T. GREELY, THE
END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 191 (2016) (proposing
that in “forty years . . . most pregnancies, among people with good health cover-
age, will be started not in bed but in vitro”); id. at 34 (stating that sexual repro-
2018] AFTER SEX 3
statement in this regard comes from Professor Henry Greely, who re-
cently predicted “the end of sex” as humans’ dominant method of in-
tentional reproduction. “[I]n the next twenty to forty years,” Greely
says, ARTs will render sex for reproduction irrelevant.8 “[S]ex [for pro-
creation] . . . will largely disappear,” he says, “or at least decrease
markedly.”9 If Greely and others are right, then we might soon inhabit
a world after sex—or at least a world after sexual procreation.
Some scholars have challenged the “end of sex” prediction on the
ground that most people are unlikely to opt for technology over sex in
order to reproduce.10 This Article challenges the “end of sex” predic-
tion for a different reason: because sex, it contends, is unlikely to van-
ish as a normative ideal in the law’s approach to ART and the family
that results from it. It argues that even if scholars are right that sex-
ual procreation could obsolesce as a reproductive form with the evolu-
tion of ART, the “symbolism associated with sexual reproduction”11
will persist for some time as a reproductive norm in the law’s engage-
ment with ART, and it will do so in ways that curtail promising tech-
nological developments, undermine technology’s radical potential, and
curb procreative and familial autonomy. On this account, something
more than technology is necessary to enable a procreative and familial
world after sex.12
Consider by way of analogy the legal relationship between mar-
riage and non-marriage. Where society is reputedly “twenty to forty”
years away from being “after sex” as its dominant method of procrea-
tion, it is arguably just a few years away from being “after marriage”13
duction is the “method of reproduction that, at least in some critical details, will
be replaced in the coming decades”); PAUL KNOEPFLER, GMO SAPIENS: THE LIFE-
CHANGING SCIENCE OF DESIGNER BABIES 9 (2016) (predicting that in just a decade
or so reproductive medicine will permit “[t]he creation of people via technology
rather than by sex”).
8. GREELY, supra note 7, at 1.
9. Id.
10. See Lori Andrews, Coitus Defunctus, 532 NATURE 35, 35 (2016) (reviewing HENRY
GREELY: THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION (2016)) (ar-
guing that Greely’s claim that technology will “replace sex as a way to create
babies” is “problematic” and doubting that most people will choose the technolo-
gies that Greely showcases).
11. F. ALLAN HANSON, TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL TECTONICS: SHIFTING VALUES AND
MEANINGS 37 (2013); see also id. (questioning whether “people [will] tenaciously
cling” to the meanings associated with sexual reproduction “even as they are re-
vealed to be obsolete”).
12. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 5 (1995) (arguing that the “sexual
family”—that is, the family associated with and produced by heterosexual inter-
course—is the “norm” or “baseline” for all families).
13. Jeff Degraff, This Is the End of Marriage, Capitalism, and God. Finally!, SALON
(Feb. 6, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/02/06/this_is_the_end_of_marriage_
capitalism_and_god_finally/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8ZHA-9WN5] (discussing
reasons why marriage rates are declining).
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as its dominant method of romantic affiliation.14 Even so, a robust
scholarly literature has coalesced around the legal relationship be-
tween marriage and non-marriage, with scholars illuminating the per-
sistence of marital law and marital norms in the regulation of non-
marital relationships.15 Referring to this dynamic as “marital
supremacy,”16 scholars have shown that marriage and its associated
ideals remain the “metric,”17 “yardstick,”18 or baseline for all relation-
ships, even in an increasingly non-marital world.
This Article argues that the law’s engagement with ART reflects a
similar dynamic—one which it calls sexual supremacy. If marital
supremacy is what happens when the law makes ideal marriage the
measure of non-marital relationships,19 then sexual supremacy is
what happens when the law makes ideal sexual procreation the mea-
sure of non-sexual procreation. In both cases, a non-traditional rela-
tionship or practice is regulated in the shadow of ideas and ideals
about a traditional relationship or practice. This Article uses the more
critically developed concept of marital supremacy to help bring into
focus this dynamic of sexual supremacy, a phenomenon that not only
casts doubt on predictions about getting to a point after sex in human
reproduction, but also is in tension with the constitutional law of the
family.
A close look at the law’s engagement with ART in areas that have
been the recent subject of intense debate—surrogacy,20 gene edit-
14. Jay L. Zagorsky, Marriage May Be Obsolete: Fewer Couples Are Getting Hitched
than Ever Before, SALON (June 3, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/06/03/marri
age_may_be_obsolete_fewer_couples_are_getting_hitched_than_ever_before_part
ner/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7AFK-7T2E] (discussing declining marriage rates
worldwide).
15. See infra section III.A.
16. Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Fam-
ily, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1277, 1279 n.2 (2015) (using the term marital supremacy “to
refer broadly to the legal privileging of marriage over non-marriage, and marital
over nonmarital families”).
17. Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 59 (2017) [here-
inafter Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage] (discussing and illuminating the
persistence of marital norms in non-marriage regulation).
18. Id. at 12; see also Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Exceptionalism, 51 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Antognini, Nonmarital Exceptionalism] (stating that in many cases marriage re-
mains “the gold standard” when courts evaluate non-marital relationships). For
other recent work on this aspect of marital supremacy, see infra notes 104–106 &
116 and accompanying text.
19. See infra section III.A for a more complete explanation of this dynamic.
20. Surrogacy has long raised ethical and legal concerns, but has recently emerged as
a subject of scholarly and legislative interest in the wake of marriage equality for
same-sex couples, many of whom rely on surrogacy as their only method of biolog-
ical family formation. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at
2351 (discussing the constitutional status of surrogacy laws in the wake of mar-
riage equality for same-sex couples); Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an
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ing,21 and gamete donor anonymity22—reveals signs of sexual
supremacy, that is, signs that the law is willing to accommodate ART
only to the extent that it conforms to ideals associated with sexual
procreation and the sexually-produced family. To be sure, in some im-
portant ways the law has discarded paradigms about sexual procrea-
tion in its approach to ART. Many jurisdictions, for instance, permit
alternative insemination by single women, and a few have expanded
the number of legal parents that a child can have beyond the tradi-
tional parental dyad.23 In many other ways, however, the law has re-
tained sexual supremacy in a range of contested areas.
Consider surrogacy law. Some states will not recognize surrogacy
agreements if the intended parents are unmarried, lack a biological
connection to any child that may result from those agreements, or are
unable to satisfy a state’s implicit requirement of dual-gender parent-
ing.24 Scholars have criticized these regimes for prioritizing marriage,
biology, and gender over other routes of family formation, like func-
tion and intent.25 We might also criticize them for embodying sexual
supremacy: the use of ideas and ideals about sexual procreation to reg-
ulate non-sexual procreation. Surrogacy parentage law privileges
LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (discussing “marriage equality’s im-
pact . . . in the campaign to lift” surrogacy bans in some states).
21. Gene editing through technologies like CRISPR/Cas9 has emerged as a site of
intense controversy in light of recent scientific developments in that area. See
infra notes 209–210 and accompanying text.
22. Anonymous egg and sperm donation is legal in the United States and is the domi-
nant industry norm, but several commentators have recently argued in favor of
legislative bans on that practice. For a summary of these commentators’ argu-
ments, see I. Glenn Cohen, Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity: Legal and Ethical
Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS 527 (Leslie Francis,
ed., 2016) (discussing the “raging debate” in the United States today over sperm
donor anonymity and summarizing the various arguments offered by opponents
and proponents of that practice).
23. On the trend toward legal recognition of multiple parents, see June Carbone &
Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9 (2017).
Both of these developments—single parenting and poly-parenting—disrupt some
of the norms associated with traditional sexual procreation, including the norm of
two and its attendant gender-based assumptions regarding essential mothering
and fathering. Even here, though, sexual procreative norms remain, as when ju-
risdictions continue to remain silent on the legal status of children born to single
women as a result of alternative insemination. See infra note 173 and accompa-
nying text.
24. See infra subsection III.B.1.
25. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2307–16; see also Doug-
las NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1185, 1258–59 (2016) [hereinafter NeJaime, The New Parenthood] (stating that
“[i]n a family law system in which intent and function govern over biology and
gender, same-sex and different-sex couples are similarly situated, both inside and
outside marriage,” and that “in a world in which marriage equality is accepted—
the post-Obergefell world—sexual-orientation nondiscrimination becomes a more
universal norm”).
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norms—like marriage, biology, and gender—that have long been asso-
ciated in law and culture with sexual procreation and the  “sexual
family”: the nuclear family bound by marriage and biology and
“founded on the heterosexual couple.”26
Consider also ART domains beyond surrogacy. The well-worn
bioethical critique of alternative reproduction as a process that “de-
signs children” (and that warrants regulation for precisely that rea-
son)27 is animated by sexual supremacy, as are the numerous recent
proposals to eliminate a key industry norm in the practice of alterna-
tive reproduction: gamete donor anonymity. In both cases, sexual pro-
creation is the dominant model for alternative reproduction.
Opponents of designer procreation either argue or strongly suggest
that alternative reproduction ought to approximate the naturalness
and randomness of sexual procreation,28 and opponents of gamete do-
nor anonymity either argue or strongly suggest that donor-conceived
children ought to enjoy the same right as sexually-conceived children
to know their biological progenitors.29
All of these examples show the law regulating and engaging with
non-sexual reproduction in the shadow of sexual procreation—not sex-
ual procreation as it actually exists, moreover, but as it ideally exists.
For instance, no jurisdiction requires sexual procreators to be married
or engage in dual-gender parenting, but some jurisdictions require the
parents of children produced through surrogacy to satisfy both of
those requirements. Similarly, designer procreation happens all the
time with sexual procreation, yet no one supports prohibiting it in that
context. Finally, sexually-conceived children are not entitled to know
the identity of both of their biological progenitors, even as commenta-
tors increasingly argue that donor-conceived children ought to enjoy
that so-called right. Looking closely at sexual supremacy, as this Arti-
cle does, therefore reveals two aspects of it: the use of sexual procrea-
tion as a metric or baseline for the regulation of non-sexual
reproduction, and the asymmetrical application of ideals about sexual
reproduction to non-sexual reproduction.
The persistence of norms relating to sexual procreation in the law’s
engagement with alternative reproduction is not surprising. During
ART’s early medical use, doctors sexualized certain ART procedures—
26. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 145.
27. See infra notes 216–45 and accompanying text. The scholar most closely allied
with this position is Michael Sandel. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE
AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING (2007) (dis-
cussing and critiquing “designer children” and “designer parents”).
28. See infra subsection III.B.2.
29. The scholar most closely allied with this position is Naomi Cahn. See, e.g., Naomi
Cahn, Do Tell! The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1077 (2014) (generally discussing donor-conceived children’s alleged “right to
know” their genetic progenitors).
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like making the husband administer the syringe on a woman being
artificially inseminated—in order to make them appear more like hav-
ing sex, thereby naturalizing them.30 More generally, core familial
structures like marriage persist in the law even, or perhaps especially,
when those structures evolve,31 and prominent cultural theorists have
identified procreative sex as the core or “central” symbol of American
kinship.32 “All of the significant symbols of American kinship are con-
tained within the figure of sexual intercourse,” the late anthropologist
David Schneider wrote.33 Indeed, many cultures “conceptualize the
creation of the [very] cosmos on the model of sexual reproduction.”34
That said, the persistence of ideals about sexual procreation in the
law’s engagement with alternative reproduction makes it harder to
suggest, as some scholars recently have, that sex will end in the next
few decades,35 or that ART represents the liberation of “sex from re-
production”36 and the “banishment of sex from reproduction.”37 To be
sure, scholars might be right that technology will soon make it possi-
ble for sexual reproduction to end as a reproductive form, or at least as
the dominant form of intentional reproduction. The law, however, is
likely to be more resistant, holding onto sexual reproduction as a re-
productive norm in much the same way that the law has held onto
marriage as an affective norm in the regulation of non-marriage.
If that is right, then sexual supremacy could frustrate the radical
potential of the technologies that will ostensibly get us to a point after
sex in intentional human reproduction, necessitating something more
than scientific innovation to guarantee the end of sex’s dominion in
American kinship. One possibility, this Article submits, is the consti-
tutional law of the family, which increasingly prohibits two features of
sexual supremacy: the official privileging of sexual procreation and
the differential treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction. This
Article maintains that along with technology, constitutional law could
get us to a world past or after sex as a dominant form and norm in
reproduction and family formation.
30. See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close
Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2002).
31. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 6 (“[T]he tenacity and vitality of our inher-
ited beliefs or ideologies about the family has meant that the changes are in some
ways superficial—merely altering form, while leaving aspiration and expectation
undisturbed.”); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996).
32. See DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, A CRITIQUE OF THE STUDY OF KINSHIP 53 (1984) (citing
sexual intercourse as a “central” or defining feature of American kinship).
33. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 1, at 40.
34. HANSON, supra note 11, at 33.
35. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
36. DAAR, supra note 4, at 2.
37. HANSON, supra note 11, at 37.
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II summarizes the techno-
logical advances that scholars claim could enable a world after sex as
humans’ dominant mode of reproduction in the next two to four de-
cades and considers the corresponding shifts in society and culture
that support that claim. It also argues that if these scholars are right,
then reproductive technology holds enormous promise to challenge
and disrupt the traditional family. Part III presents the case for why
ideas and ideals about sexual procreation are likely to persist in the
law’s approach to non-sexual reproduction, confounding predictions
about the end of sex in human reproduction and limiting the radical
potential of the technologies that will purportedly get us to a point
after sex.
Part III builds that case by first explaining what this Article
means by sexual supremacy, using the more critically developed con-
cept of marital supremacy to describe its dynamic by way of analogy.
While marital supremacy can take many forms, this Part focuses on
an aspect that is helpful for understanding sexual supremacy: the
law’s use of marital ideals to define the substance of non-marriage.
After defining sexual supremacy and describing its dynamic by way of
analogy to marital supremacy, Part III reveals the work that sexual
supremacy is doing in the law’s contemporary engagement with alter-
native reproduction. It focuses in particular on the presence of sexual
supremacy in the law of surrogacy, debates over egg and sperm donor
anonymity, and legal and bioethical debates over designer children in
the gene editing context and beyond. Just as ideals about marriage
define the legal and cultural terrain of non-marriage, this Part shows,
so too do ideals about sexual procreation and the sexually-produced
family define the legal and cultural terrain of non-sexual
reproduction.
Parts IV and V reconsider and reimagine, respectively, claims
about the end of sex in intentional human reproduction. Part IV uses
the observations made in the previous Part to suggest that sex will not
end anytime soon in the law’s engagement with alternative reproduc-
tion, notwithstanding the evolution of the technology that could make
the end of sex for reproduction a possibility. This Part shows not only
that sex is likely to persist as a normative ideal in the law’s approach
to non-sexual reproduction, but also that it will persist in ways that
frustrate the radical potential of many of the technologies thought to
enable a world after sex. Even so, there are limits on the extent to
which sexual supremacy may constrain the law’s engagement with
non-sexual reproduction, and Part V considers some of them. It
imagines the end of sex not from the standpoint of technology, as other
scholars have, but from the standpoint of the law, offering constitu-
tional arguments that could help to enable a reproductive and familial
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world less tethered to norms and ideals about sexual reproduction and
the sexually-produced family. Part VI concludes.
II. AFTER SEX AS A REPRODUCTIVE FORM
Will sex for procreation go the same way as the VCR and Sony
Walkman? So one might think based on some scholars’ recent predic-
tions about alternative reproductive technology and its potential to
revolutionize human reproduction. Section II.A summarizes those pre-
dictions as well as some of the reproductive technologies on which
they are based. That section also considers the social and legal shifts
in family life and reproduction that render those predictions more
plausible than they might appear at first blush. Section II.B considers
the promise that a world of non-sexual reproduction holds for the fam-
ily. It argues that if scholars are right about the reproductive technol-
ogies on the horizon, then the future of alternative reproduction holds
enormous potential to disrupt the traditional family associated with
sexual reproduction.
A. The Future of Sexless Reproduction
1. The Technology of Sexless Reproduction
The use of ARTs to procreate has witnessed an “explosion”38 since
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) first started
collecting statistics on them in 1996. In that year, approximately
64,000 ART cycles were performed, resulting in approximately 21,000
live babies born. Ten years later, approximately 138,000 ART cycles
were performed, resulting in approximately 55,000 live babies born—
a 114% and 162% increase, respectively, in just one decade.39 Simi-
larly, the ten-year period from 2002 to 2012 (the last year for which
CDC data is available) also witnessed growth both in ART cycles and
in babies born, increasing during that time by 28% and 34%, respec-
tively.40 According to the CDC, 1.6% of all children born in the United
States in 2012 were the result of ART.41
38. DAAR, supra note 4, at 16.
39. Id. at 14.
40. Id. at 13–14.
41. As mentioned earlier, actual ART use in the United States is much higher than
these statistics suggest given that the CDC does not include in its data artificial
insemination by sperm donor (AID), a form of ART that results in approximately
60,000 live babies born each year. See DAAR, supra note 4, at 10–11 (noting that
“the federal government’s exclusive focus on IVF limits study of other forms of
assisted conception” and that the “impact of an IVF-only definition of ART is the
potential for skewing perceptions about the demographics of ART users,” which
include “those who use AID”). Given the under-inclusiveness of the CDC’s defini-
tion of alternative reproduction, it is more accurate to say that more than 3% of
all children born in the United States in 2012 were the result of ART, rendering it
a “far greater” player “in family formation than domestic infant adoption.” Id. at
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Scholars predict that the ART “boom”42 of the early twenty-first
century will continue on its upward trajectory, especially given ex-
traordinary advances in reproductive science and medicine. Some
scholars, in fact, argue that ART’s increasing use and sophistication
could in time create a situation where alternative reproduction re-
places sex as humans’ principal vehicle of perpetuating the species, at
least intentionally.
Professor Dov Fox, for example, has recently argued that
“[i]mpressive advances in reproductive medicine and technology”43
support his earlier prediction that “prospective parents might one day
forgo the genetic randomness of sexual reproduction for increasingly
powerful and affordable opportunities to choose for certain biological
traits or dispositions in their future children.”44 “As advances in ge-
netic science permit increasing prenatal control over offspring traits,”
Fox contends, “even fertile couples may choose to relocate procreation
from the bedroom to the laboratory.”45 Similarly, Professor Paul
Knoepfler argues that ARTs could lead to “[t]he creation of people via
technology rather than by sex.”46 “Not only would sex be unneces-
sary,” Knoepfler writes, “but there could also be almost no physical
parental involvement at all to produce a baby.”47
Most outspoken—and insistent—about the obsolescence of sex as
humans’ principal mode of intentionally reproducing is Professor
Henry Greely, who recently predicted in his book The End of Sex and
the Future of Human Reproduction (End of Sex), among other out-
lets,48 that technology will replace sex for reproductive purposes in as
little as two to four decades. In “forty years,” Greely writes in the
widely reviewed End of Sex,49 “most pregnancies among people with
9; see also NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2285 nn.141–42
(citing recent statistics indicating that ART use has “soar[ed]” in the twenty-first
century).
42. DAAR, supra note 4, at 23.
43. Fox, supra note 7, at 299 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 298 (citation omitted).
45. Id.
46. KNOEPFLER, supra note 7, at 9; see also Paul Knoepfler, You’re Only Human, but
Your Kids Could Be So Much More, WIRED (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.wired
.com/2015/12/youre-only-human-but-your-kids-could-be-so-much-more/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/9B4L-BVHG] (stating a similar position).
47. KNOEPFLER, supra note 7, at 13.
48. See generally GREELY, supra note 7; see also Aurora Macrae Crerar, Will Genetic
Advances Make Sex Obsolete?, NPR (June 16, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/health-shots/2016/06/16/482189322/will-baby-making-move-from-the-bed-
room-to-the-lab (interview with Henry Greely); The End of Sex and the Future of
Baby-Making, ASPEN IDEAS FESTIVAL (2017), https://www.aspenideas.org/session/
end-sex-and-future-baby-making [https://perma.unl.edu/Z5E4-WLDX] (Greely’s
interview with Carl Zimmer).
49. For reviews, see Glenn C. Altschuler, Mid Twenty-First Century Birthers, Review,
PSYCH. TODAY (June 7, 2017) (reviewing HENRY GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE
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good health coverage will be started not in bed but in vitro.”50 Sexual
reproduction, he contends, is the “method of reproduction that, at
least in some critical details, will be replaced in the coming de-
cades.”51 As Greely explained to New York Times science writer Carl
Zimmer before an audience at the Aspen Ideas Festival in June 2017,
people will continue to have sex for many of the reasons that they al-
ready do: “because they like it,” “as a token of love,” “because they’re
forced to,” and “to make money.”52 What they will do with decreasing
frequency, he predicts, is have sex in order to reproduce. “There will
be sex but there will be a lot less sex for making babies,” Greely says.
Sex itself will not end, he reassures, but it will end as a vehicle for
intentional reproduction.53
Greely maintains that two developments in reproductive science
and medicine will facilitate the world after sex that he envisions. The
first development concerns the way in which human embryos are pro-
duced. Today, human conception occurs through the joining of ga-
metes—eggs and sperm—that originate in the ovaries (in most
women) and in the testes (in most men).54 In the near future, Greely
posits, eggs and sperm will originate instead from something as sim-
ple as a common skin cell through a process called in vitro gametogen-
esis (IVG), which involves the creation of eggs and sperm through
human stem cells known as “induced pluripotent stem cells,” or
“human iPSCs.”55 IPSC creation was successfully performed by scien-
tists on mouse cells in 2006 and later on human skin cells in 2007;56 it
FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION (2016)) https://www.sce.cornell.edu/sce/alt-
schuler/pdf/altschuler_review_20160607_1029.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/FA9S-
CMUH]; Andrews, supra note 10; Emma Green, Making Babies, No Sex Neces-
sary, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/
06/babies-sex/531735/ [https://perma.unl.edu/NQ4X-LQX3]; Tanya Lewis, Re-
view: The End of Sex, THE SCIENTIST (May 13, 2016), https://www.the-scientist
.com/?articles.view/articleNo/46086/title/Review—The-End-of-Sex/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/W354-DX76]; Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, The End of Sex and the Future
of Human Reproduction, 57 JURIMETRICS 433 (2017) (reviewing HENRY GREELY,
THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION (2016)); Sonia Suter,
Book Review, 3 J.L. & BIOSCI. 436 (2016) (reviewing HENRY GREELY, THE END OF
SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION (2016)).
50. GREELY, supra note 7, at 191.
51. Id. at 34.
52. The End of Sex and the Future of Baby-Making, supra note 48.
53. Id.
54. Eggs originate in some men—transgender men who retain their reproductive or-
gans from birth—in the ovaries, and sperm originates in some women—trans-
gender women who retain their reproductive organs from birth—in the testes.
55. GREELY, supra note 7, at 12.
56. See Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult
Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861 (2007). For academic and
popular coverage of this procedure and its legal and ethical implications, see
Sonia M. Suter, In vitro Gametogenesis: Just Another Way To Have a Baby?, 3
J.L. & BIOSCI. 87 (2016); Kelly Murray, Could We One Day Make Babies from
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has been replicated so many times since those landmark experiments
that “[m]aking iPSCs [in this way] has now become routine.”57
The second development in reproductive science and medicine that
in Greely’s view will pave the way for the end of sex as humans’ pri-
mary mode of reproducing is genomic profiling. Today, limited geno-
mic profiling of embryos exists in the form of preimplantation genetic
diagnosis, or PGD, which is the process of “tak[ing] away a few cells
from an early ‘test tube’ embryo, test[ing] them for a genetic trait or
two, and us[ing] that information to decide whether to give the embryo
a chance to become a baby.”58 PGD today “is only weakly informative,
as well as expensive, unpleasant, and even dangerous, thanks both to
the limitations of genetic testing and to the necessity of using IVF as
part of PGD.”59 In the future, Greely predicts, PGD will become “eas-
ier” and “better”60 because of considerable advances in the two
processes on which PGD relies: DNA (or genome) sequencing and
DNA interpretation.61
Only Skin Cells?, CNN (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/09/health/
embryo-skin-cell-ivg/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/P55A-YUXK]; Tamar
Lewin, Babies from Skin Cells? Prospect Is Unsettling to Some Experts, N.Y.
TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/health/ivg-reproduc-
tive-technology.html.
57. GREELY, supra note 7, at 99. While scientists have generated egg and sperm cells
in mice through the iPSC process and have created baby mice with mouse eggs
created through IVG, they have yet to generate (or join) egg and sperm cells in
humans through that process. See Lewin, supra note 56 (stating that “in vitro
gametogenesis, or I.V.G., so far has been used only in mice” but noting that “stem
cell biologists say it is only a matter of time before it could be used in human
reproduction—opening up mind-boggling possibilities”); Antonio Regalado, A
New Way to Reproduce, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.technolo-
gyreview.com/s/608452/a-new-way-to-reproduce [https://perma.unl.edu/7VVK-
AHET] (reporting that “[s]o far, the exact biochemical formula for prompting a
stem cell to mature into functional human eggs or sperm remains out of reach. No
human skin cell has been turned into a bona fide human reproductive cell. But
many scientists believe it’s only a matter of time—maybe only a year or two—
before they get the right recipe”).
58. GREELY, supra note 7, at 2.
59. Id. at 3. It is “expensive,” “unpleasant, and even dangerous” because it is only
performed on embryos created through IVF, a costly process that involves hor-
mone-induced ovarian stimulation and transvaginal egg retrieval on a patient
who may or may not be under general anesthesia. Id. at 54. It is “only weakly
informative” because it currently offers parents limited—although for many par-
ents important—information, including an embryo’s sex or “DNA associated with
a genetic disease found in the family.” Id. at 11. Its current limitations mean that
PGD is only infrequently used by prospective parents today; as Greely observes,
PGD is an “uncommon curiosity” that in 2012 appealed to only 5% of individuals
undergoing IVF cycles. Id. at 88.
60. Id. at 107.
61. DNA sequencing has “changed dramatically over the past forty years,” Greely
notes, and, in his view, will continue to become more sophisticated, more accu-
rate, and less costly. In 2009, for instance, whole sequencing of a single human
genome cost $48,000. Just one year later, that cost was reduced to $5,000, and by
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Greely uses the term “Easy PGD”62 to refer to the two processes
described above that will quite possibly revolutionize reproduction:
IVG and genomic profiling. Where IVG will make possible the rela-
tively cheap and easy production of hundreds of embryos, advances in
genomic profiling will make possible the relatively cheap and easy
profiling of those embryos by fertility specialists and prospective par-
ents. These two processes together compose “Easy PGD,” which is at
once an extension of the past—“just another application of two long-
standing (and entirely legal) medical procedures, IVF and PGD”63—
and “a large part of the future”64 of human reproduction as one where
the species is perpetuated mainly through mechanisms other than
sex.
2. The Social and Legal Shifts Favoring Sexless Reproduction
While outlandish at first blush, the claim by Greely and others
that sex for procreation will become irrelevant for most people in as
soon as a few decades finds some support in current social and legal
trends around intimate and family life. Aside from both the growing
popularity of alternative reproduction and the increasing sophistica-
tion of the technology that facilitates it, there are other reasons to be-
lieve that non-sexual reproduction could become a more common route
of family formation in the future.
First, more people today are having less sex, thereby paving the
way, perhaps, for sex’s decreasing salience in all aspects of our lives,
including in reproduction. A number of recent studies indicate notable
declines in sexual frequency for all age groups, including the group
most likely to avail itself of advances in ART: young people.65 Re-
2015 a Bay Area company was offering whole genome sequences for
$1,500–$2,000. This rapid decline in the cost of whole genome sequencing makes
it “entirely plausible to expect a $200 genome [per embryo] within five or ten
years.” Id. at 112. Greely also predicts that scientists will be able to produce
whole genome sequences in just a few hours within the next twenty to forty years.
Id. at 113. Genomic interpretation will also continue to improve, providing pro-
spective parents information not only about serious early-onset genetic condi-
tions like Tay-Sachs disease but also about later onset diseases like Alzheimer
disease as well as about a range of cosmetic and behavioral traits. See id. at
114–19.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 175.
64. Id. at 105.
65. For instance, a 2016 study reported that millennials, the generation of children
born between 1982 and 2002, are having less sex than their Gen-X predecessors
and that the younger half of millennials “is twice as likely to be sexually active in
their first years of adulthood as Gen X-ers were.” Janet Burns, Millennials Are
Having Less Sex than Other Gens, but Experts Say it’s (Probably) Fine, FORBES
(Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2016/08/16/millenni-
als-are-having-less-sex-than-other-gens-but-experts-say-its-probably-fine/#3ea3a
aa3d958 [https://perma.unl.edu/LY27-FCNF]. For the 2016 study, see Jean M.
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searchers have offered several rationales for these declines, but at
least one of them suggests that falling sex rates could persist well into
the future: the nature of communication in the digital age.66 Smart
phones and other devices are widely viewed as causing declines in
human intimacy,67 and the emergence of virtual reality products like
Oculus Rift and HTC Vive could facilitate what researchers see as the
waning of physical interaction in the digital age on an even larger
scale.68 Indeed, virtual sex is already available with the aid of a head-
set,69 and if technological advances continue, then sex for any pur-
pose, be it recreational or procreative, could become less common.
Correspondingly, such advances could cause reproduction through
Twenge et al., Sexual Inactivity During Young Adulthood is More Common
Among U.S. Millennials and iGen: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects on Having No
Sexual Partners After Age 18, 46 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 433 (2017). Research-
ers have also identified “a particular trend toward sexual inactivity among mil-
lennial and nascent Gen-Z women” and they also note that “15 percent of the 20-
to 24-year-old set has not had sex since coming of age, which is a 6 percent bump
from early ‘90s rates.” Burns, supra. A CDC study released two years ago also
found that “[t]he percentage of high school students who are currently sexually
active (had sexual intercourse during the past three months) has decreased from
38% in 1991 to 30% in 2015.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC
Releases Youth Risk Behavior Survey Results, https://www.cdc.gov/features/yrbs/
index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/7QRB-U9XG]. Moreover, a 2017 study indi-
cates that sexlessness is affecting older folks, too. That study reported declines in
sexual frequency for American adults that were similar across gender, race, re-
gion, educational level, and work status, and that were largest among adults in
their 50s, those with school-age children, and those who did not watch pornogra-
phy. Moreover, controlling for both age and time period, the study’s authors
found that those born in the 1930s—the so-called “silent generation”—had sex
the most often, whereas those born in the 1990s had sex the least often. See Jean
M. Twenge et al., Declines in Sexual Frequency Among American Adults,
1989–2014, 46 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 2389 (2017). It is worth noting that
adult sexual frequency rates might actually be lower than those reported in this
study, given people’s general tendency to lie on surveys and given their specific
tendency to over-report how often they are having sex. See generally SETH STE-
PHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES: BIG DATA, NEW DATA, AND WHAT THE IN-
TERNET CAN TELL US ABOUT WHO WE REALLY ARE 5 (2017) (observing that an
analysis of Google searches “give[s] a far less lively—and, [the author] argues, far
more accurate—picture of sex during marriage” than surveys suggest).
66. See Burns, supra note 65.
67. See, e.g., Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital
Age (2015); Sherry Turkle, Stop Googling. Let’s Talk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/opinion/sunday/stop-googling-lets-talk
.html.
68. Both of these products are virtual reality devices that are now commercially
available. See Brian X. Chen, Virtual Reality Check: Rating the HTC Vive and the
Oculus Rift, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/tech-
nology/personaltech/virtual-reality-check-rating-the-htc-vive-and-the-oculus-rift
.html.
69. See Alyson Krueger, Virtual Reality Gets Naughty, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/style/virtual-reality-porn.html.
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technology, including the kind of technology discussed earlier, to be-
come normalized, naturalized, and eventually more widespread.
Second, more sub-groups are using ART to procreate and societal
trends suggest that ART use by those groups will continue to increase
in the future. For instance, same-sex couples and single sexual minori-
ties are growing consumers of alternative reproduction,70 fueled in
large part by increasing social acceptance of gays and lesbians and by
the legal availability of same-sex marriage for them.71 Similarly, older
women are increasingly using ART to procreate,72 as are unpartnered
men and women. Indeed, the birthrate for women that were both older
70. See, e.g., DAAR, supra note 4, at 11 (observing that “commercial sperm banks re-
port that about half of their clientele . . . are lesbian couples and single women”);
Caitlin McCarey, Lesbian Designer Babies, HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2016),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/caitlin-mccarey/lesbian-designer-babies_b_9823
468.html [https://perma.unl.edu/U7PF-A5AJ].
71. On this point, a recent study by the Williams Institute reports that “[m]arried
same-sex couples are much more likely than their unmarried counterparts to
have kids,” suggesting that the legal availability of marriage could contribute to
increasing rates of procreation within that class. See 700,000 Americans Are Mar-
ried to a Same-sex Spouse, Married Same-sex Couples More Likely to Raise
Adopted, Foster Children and Are More Economically Secure, New Reports Show,
WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (Mar. 5, 2015), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/
press-releases/married-same-sex-couples-more-likely-to-raise-adopted-foster-
children-and-have-more-economic-resources-new-reports-show/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/S8CE-NPWM]; see also DAAR, supra note 4, at 206 (stating that the
“[i]ncorporation of more and novel family structures into the fabric of our culture
will broaden the need and correspondingly the availability of reproductive assis-
tance” in the form of ART). The legal availability of marriage for same-sex
couples might stimulate even unmarried gays and lesbians to use alternative re-
production as a method of family formation, as marriage equality, at least on one
reading, could legitimize gay identity and gay parenting regardless of whether
either exists within a marital setting. See NeJaime, The New Parenthood, supra
note 25, at 1253 (arguing that marriage equality embodies a broader principle of
sexual orientation equality in matters pertaining to family formation and that
the marriage equality precedent might—counterintuitively—reduce the salience
of marriage itself as the basis for parentage recognition).
72. Recent CDC data “supports the observation that increases on the demand side [of
ART] are attributable in part to the greater numbers of older women seeking
treatment.” DAAR, supra note 4, at 21. Delayed procreation, particularly for wo-
men, negatively impacts fertility, and could therefore stimulate older women to
seek technological assistance to reproduce. See id. at 20–22, 82. Whether married
or not, women are having children at older ages, and older women are much more
likely to have children than they were a few decades ago. See Nicholas Bakalar,
Women Waiting Longer to Have Children, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/science/age-when-american-women-have-children
.html (“American women are having their first babies at increasingly older
ages.”); Claire Cain Miller, Single Motherhood, in Decline Over All, Rises for Wo-
men 35 and Older, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/
09/upshot/out-of-wedlock-births-are-falling-except-among-older-women.html?ac
tion=click&contentCollection=Science&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Mar
ginalia&pgtype=article.
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and unmarried has increased significantly since 2002—by 48%.73
Many of those women, the New York Times reports, “used sperm do-
nors,”74 and an increasing number of them are using surrogacy to
have children.75 The percentage of single fathers having children
through surrogacy and adoption has also increased significantly in the
last ten years, both in the United States and abroad. In California, for
instance, three times more single men are raising children than two
decades ago, and many of them are turning to surrogacy in order to do
so.76
B. The Promise of Sexless Reproduction
If scholars are right about the reproductive technologies on the ho-
rizon, then the future of alternative reproduction holds significant
promise to disrupt the traditional family associated with sexual repro-
duction. Consider in vitro gametogenesis, or IVG. Creating eggs and
sperm from the skin cells of humans—rather than from unborn em-
bryos—the IVG process has the capacity to revolutionize the family
because it could allow individuals, or even an individual, to generate
eggs and sperm from their own skin cells and to use those gametes to
create a child.77 IVG with human iPSCs could eliminate many of the
intermediaries who help effectuate family formation for infertile
couples and individuals, including state and private actors who facili-
tate the adoption process, sperm donors, egg donors, or some combina-
tion of all of those things. It could allow a same-sex male or female
couple to create a child genetically related to both members,78 a single
individual to become a “uniparent” by using gametes generated from
her own cells,79 or even three or more people to combine their gametes
to create a child—something which commentators call “multiplex
parenting.”80
73. Miller, supra note 72.
74. Id.
75. Kelly Wallace, Is 50 the New 40 for Motherhood?, CNN (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www
.cnn.com/2015/03/02/living/feat-rise-50-year-old-mom/index.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/G78V-9X77] (discussing older women turning to surrogacy as a method
of family formation).
76. Nicholas Blincoe, Why Men Decide to Become Single Dads, GUARDIAN (Nov. 2,
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/nov/02/men-single-dad-fa-
ther-surrogacy-adoption [https://perma.unl.edu/2A6B-4VTM].
77. See GREELY, supra note 7, at 136.
78. Id. at 135. While “scientists believe it will be possible to make eggs from a man’s
skin cell and sperm from a woman’s skin cell,” they note that creating sperm
through the iPSC process on women “would be more difficult because women lack
Y chromosomes.” Regalado, supra note 57.
79. GREELY, supra note 7, at 135.
80. Id. at 190; see also Suter, supra note 56, at 88 (suggesting that “IVG could facili-
tate ‘multiplex’ parenting, where groups of more than two individuals (whether
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More radical yet, IVG with human iPSCs could enable the end of
sex both as a reproductive activity and as a marker of gender because
it could obviate the need not only for sexual intercourse to reproduce
but also for one person who is “XX” and another who is “XY” to do so.81
In addition, by permitting a biological male to make a “female” repro-
ductive contribution (the egg) and a biological female to make a “male”
reproductive contribution (the sperm),82 IVG could disaggregate bio-
logical sex and gender in ways that begin to challenge the law’s last
remaining basis for differential treatment of men and women: biologi-
cal difference.83
In domains as varied as federal immigration law and state adop-
tion law (and many others in between), so-called biological differences
between the sexes are accepted as constitutionally permissible rea-
sons to treat them differently and unequally.84 Admittedly, the so-
called legitimate reproductive difference that so often makes a rele-
vant legal difference relates not so much to eggs and sperm, but rather
to the fact that only biological females can gestate and bear children.85
Even so, putting to one side the possibility that alternative reproduc-
tive medicine could one day offer the prospect of artificial wombs ges-
all male, all female, or a combination) procreate together, producing children who
are the genetic progeny of them all”).
81. GREELY, supra note 7, at 135.
82. As noted earlier, generating sperm cells from female skin cells through the iPSC
process could prove challenging given that women lack Y chromosomes. See
Regalado, supra note 57.
83. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010) (discussing cases upholding bio-
logical difference as a limit on the constitutionally grounded anti-stereotyping
principle); NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2352.
84. See, e.g., NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2352 (discussing
the role of biological difference in immigration law and in the law of unwed fa-
thers and adoption); Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C.
L. REV. 1187, 1219–21 (2016) (discussing and critiquing judicial reliance on bio-
logical difference to justify laws that treat unwed mothers and unwed fathers
differently in the contexts of adoption and citizenship transmission).
85. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2267. Sometimes, courts
cite the gestation of children as a constitutionally adequate justification for laws
that treat men (fathers) and women (mothers) differently on the theory that ges-
tation permits women, but not men, to develop relationships with their children
before birth. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) (stating that
whereas “[t]he mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental
relationship is clear,” fathers must do more to prove their paternal commitments)
(citation omitted). Other times, courts cite the birth of children as a constitution-
ally adequate justification for laws that treat men (fathers) and women (mothers)
differently on the theory that the event of birth is evidence of maternity but not of
paternity. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 61–63 (2001) (upholding the federal
government’s unequal treatment of unwed mothers and unwed fathers in the citi-
zenship transmission context on the ground that birth ‘assures’ that a biological
relationship exists between mothers and their children but not between fathers
and their children).
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tating a child outside a woman’s body (thereby eliminating the truly
last marker of reproductive difference),86 reproductive practices like
IVG that disrupt the relationship between genetics and gender could
start to unsettle the traditional family founded on heterosexual repro-
duction and dual-gender parenthood.
******
In sum, dizzying advances in the technology of non-sexual repro-
duction, coupled with trends in society that are likely to increase rates
of non-sexual reproduction, support scholars’ claim that in the near
future, significantly more intentional human reproduction will occur
without sex. On this account, technology and culture will coalesce to
ensure the deliberate “creation of people via technology rather than by
sex.”87 As Greely more colorfully puts it: “Instead of being conceived in
a bed, in the backseat of a car, or under a ‘Keep off the Grass’ sign,
children will be conceived in clinics.”88 The twentieth century’s un-
tethering of sex and procreation through the legalization of contracep-
tion89 will continue into the twenty-first. Now, however, instead of the
flourishing of non-procreative sex, society will witness the flourishing
of non-sexual procreation and the radically different family enabled by
it.
III. THE PERSISTENCE OF SEX AS A REPRODUCTIVE NORM:
SEXUAL SUPREMACY
Part III now unsettles the claim, presented in Part II, that sex will
disappear from our reproductive landscape in as soon as a few de-
cades, or will soon factor considerably less in that landscape than it
does currently. Some scholars have already disputed that claim on de-
scriptive grounds. Reviewing Greely’s The End of Sex in the science
magazine Nature, for instance, Professor Lori Andrews predicts that
technology is unlikely to “replace sex as a way to create babies” for a
number of reasons, including the fact that people today are not rush-
ing to use technology to control their children’s genetic inheritance
86. This could happen sooner than we might think. See Sabrina Stierwalt, Could Ar-
tificial Wombs Be a Reality?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.scientificamer-
ican.com/article/could-artificial-wombs-be-a-reality/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
6AQV-7DSQ].
87. KNOEPFLER, supra note 7, at 9.
88. GREELY, supra note 7, at 1.
89. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from treating single
persons and married persons differently with respect to their decisions to use
contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a right to marital privacy
that prohibits the government from criminalizing married persons’ use of
contraception).
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even though a limited form of such technology currently exists.90 An-
drews also doubts that most people will be able to afford, or that most
insurance will cover, the kinds of prenatal genetic technologies that
will allow non-sexual reproduction to flourish—and sexual reproduc-
tion, correspondingly, to end.91
This Article is skeptical about sex’s ostensible end for a different
reason: because sexual procreation, it submits, is likely to persist as a
reproductive norm in the law’s engagement with ART, even if it could
otherwise end as a reproductive form on which people rely to have
children. In a way, Greely’s predictive claim is a more extreme version
of the recent observation that alternative reproduction represents a
clean break from, or a clear alternative to, sexual procreation. “ART is
designed to bypass or substitute for” sexual procreation, Professor
Daar writes.92 “By disaggregating sex from reproduction,” she contin-
ues, “ART is the story of both technical sophistication and social liber-
ation.”93 As another commentator puts it, ART removes “sex from the
equation”94 and represents the “banishment of sex from
reproduction.”95
Even if those statements are technically true, sexual procreation
remains an integral part of the reproductive “equation” by constitut-
ing the lens or frame through which the law views and regulates alter-
native reproduction. As they have in the past, ideas and ideals about
sexual procreation will likely shape legal engagements with alterna-
tive procreation,96 and they will do so in ways that undermine procre-
ative liberty and undercut the radical potential of the technologies
that could make a future after sex even possible.
This Part refers to the persistence of sexual procreative ideals in
the law’s contemporary engagement with alternative reproduction as
sexual supremacy. Sexual supremacy, it shows, is the law’s use of ide-
als about sexual procreation to regulate non-sexual procreation. Sex-
ual supremacy, it argues, marks the law’s current approach to
alternative reproduction and will likely continue to do so even as ART
evolves in more sophisticated ways toward the so-called “end of sex.”
Indeed, this Part suggests that while alternative reproductive technol-
ogy might soon be able to completely “disaggregat[e] sex from repro-
duction,”97 the law is likely to lag behind, remaining tethered to a
particular conception of sexual procreation while it engages with its
non-sexual counterpart.
90. Andrews, supra note 10, at 35.
91. Id. at 36.
92. DAAR, supra note 4, at 1–2.
93. Id. at 2.
94. HANSON, supra note 11, at 17.
95. Id. at 37.
96. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
97. DAAR, supra note 4, at 2.
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Section III.A begins by briefly defining sexual supremacy and by
using a more critically developed concept to understand its workings
by way of analogy: marital supremacy. Marital supremacy illustrates
how the substance and structure of a traditional form so often linked
in law and culture to procreation (marriage)98 might persist in the law
even as society has moved past, or is moving past, that form. It also
serves as a cautionary tale for those who predict that the future en-
tails both the end of sex for intentional reproduction and the liberation
of sex from reproduction, as marital supremacy suggests a more com-
plicated picture of what the evolution of kinship looks like and how it
occurs.
After defining and explaining sexual supremacy by way of analogy
in section III.A, section III.B reveals instances of sexual supremacy in
the law’s current approach to ART, specifically, in surrogacy law, in
proposed regulations of egg and sperm donation, and in legal and ethi-
cal debates over designer children in the gene editing context and
beyond.
A. Sexual Supremacy Defined and the Marital Supremacy
Analogy
1. Sexual Supremacy Defined
Sexual supremacy is the law’s privileging of sexual procreation and
its presumed norms in the regulation of non-sexual reproduction. Sex-
ual supremacy involves the privileging of a certain kind of family asso-
ciated with sexual reproduction: the “sexual family,” defined by
Professor Martha Fineman as the “foundational” family “founded on
the heterosexual couple—a reproductive, biological pairing.”99 In ad-
dition, sexual supremacy involves the privileging of a certain kind of
process commonly associated with sexual reproduction: a process that
is somewhat random and open to chance rather than overly curated
and tightly controlled.100 Section III.B illustrates how the law often
makes both of these things—the ideal sexual procreative family (bio-
logical, dual gender, married) and the ideal sexual procreative process
(random, open to chance)—the measure of non-sexual reproduction by
requiring non-sexual reproduction to resemble them in order to re-
ceive recognition and protection. In this sense, sexual supremacy re-
sembles the phenomenon to which section III.A now turns, one that
has received careful attention by legal scholars and whose dynamic is
98. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (referring to marriage
and procreation as “related rights”).
99. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 145.
100. For a more detailed overview of sexual procreation’s presumed characteristics in
arguments supporting ART regulation, see Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived,
supra note 2, at 657–62.
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helpful for understanding what this Article means by sexual
supremacy: marital supremacy.
2. The Marital Supremacy Analogy
A robust body of scholarship has coalesced around the concept of
marital supremacy, defined as the privileging of marriage, even in a
world where people are marrying less frequently. Professor Serena
Mayeri used the term “marital supremacy” in a recent article “to refer
broadly to the legal privileging of marriage over non-marriage, and
marital over nonmarital families.”101 Like Mayeri, some scholars have
focused on the law’s privileging of marriage over non-marriage by re-
vealing instances where the law channels, or even coerces, unmarried
partners into an actual marriage.102 Others have broadened the con-
cept of marital supremacy by focusing on the law’s privileging of mar-
riage within non-marriage. Scholars in this second group have
detailed the extent to which the law molds non-marital relationships
in the shadow of marriage by subjecting non-marriage to marital
101. Mayeri, supra note 16, at 1279 n.2. Mayeri elaborates on the presence of marital
supremacy in the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy cases from the 1960s and 1970s,
which simultaneously vindicated some of the rights of non-marital children under
the Constitution and upheld the primacy of marriage over non-marriage.
Notwithstanding advocates’ more expansive constitutional arguments against
marital supremacy, Mayeri shows, the Court struck down non-marriage classifi-
cations not because they promoted traditional marriage, but rather because they
harmed so-called “innocent” non-marital children. See id.
102. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Negative Identity, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1406–10 (2015)
(cataloguing the ways in which the law uses marital status as a basis for discrim-
inatory treatment, privileging not just marital over non-marital relationships but
marital relationships over singledom); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not
To Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509 (2016) [hereinafter Matsumura, A Right Not
To Marry] (describing how several states have responded to the recognition of
same-sex marriage in their jurisdictions by either automatically converting
same-sex domestic partnerships and civil unions into marriage, without the con-
sent of the domestic partners, or continuing the receipt of same-sex partnership
benefits, like health insurance, on domestic partners entering into a marriage);
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999
(2017) [hereinafter Matsumura, Choosing Marriage] (detailing and criticizing in-
stances where the law co-opts cohabitants into marriage without them necessa-
rily choosing marriage); Melissa Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 661, 664 (2015) [hereinafter Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage]
(discussing instances where courts conflate non-marriage and marriage when
protecting the rights of unmarried cohabitants and criticizing “the broader eli-
sion—and erasure—of nonmarriage in our law and culture”); Melissa Murray,
Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1207,
1239–57 (2016) [hereinafter Murray, Nonmarriage Inequality] (exposing places
where the law prioritizes marriage over non-marriage, particularly in a post-mar-
riage-equality world, and reviewing the capture of non-marriage by marriage in
the areas of relationship recognition, the extension of rights and benefits (like
wrongful death), and non-marital parenting).
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norms, paradigms, and ideals.103 These scholars focus less on the
law’s channeling of intimate partners into an actual marriage and
more on the law’s imposition of marital norms and ideals on unmar-
ried relationships104—often to the latter’s detriment.105
This second understanding of marital supremacy is the one that is
most useful for understanding what this Article means by sexual
supremacy. Marital supremacy understood in this sense involves two
related aspects: the imposition of marital ideals on non-marital rela-
tionships and the selective application of those ideals to non-marital
relationships.106 Both aspects of marital supremacy appear in a vari-
ety of doctrinal areas, but are most often on display when courts eval-
uate non-marital relationships to determine whether they function
like a marriage and therefore merit legal recognition.107
103. See, e.g., Antognini, Nonmarital Exceptionalism, supra note 18; Antognini, The
Law of Nonmarriage, supra note 17, at 52–58 (discussing instances where the
law requires non-marital relationships to conform to the dominant cultural
norms surrounding marriage in order to receive recognition and protection);
Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship and
the Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 54–61
(2012) [hereinafter Cahill, Regulating at the Margins] (revealing instances where
the law uses marital ideals to regulate unmarried relationships); Ariela R.
Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of
the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003) (discussing the law’s reliance
on marriage, both historically and today, when extending legal protections to un-
married cohabitants); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Struc-
ture for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167 (2015) (documenting the
imposition of marital family law on non-marital families in areas like child cus-
tody and child support and critiquing the corrosive impact of that imposition);
Murray, Nonmarriage Inequality, supra note 102, at 1225–39 (observing the
privileging of marriage within non-marriage in Supreme Court landmarks like
Lawrence v. Texas and Moore v. City of East Cleveland and arguing that the
Court in these cases extended constitutional protection to non-marital relation-
ships only because they conformed to the Court’s vision of the ideal marital fam-
ily); Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Non marital
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87 (2014) (docu-
menting the use of marriage norms in cases extending legal protection to unmar-
ried cohabitants).
104. See Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, supra note 17, at 11 (observing that
courts rely on “marriage as the yardstick” when determining whether to dis-
tribute property at the dissolution of a non-marital relationship).
105. See id. at 59 (stating that “the metric of marriage results in making recovery
difficult for nonmarital couples where the relationship veers in any way from
what marriage ought to look like”); Huntington, supra note 103 (documenting the
corrosive impact that the imposition of marital family law has had on non-mari-
tal families and their children).
106. I have explored this second aspect of marital supremacy—the asymmetrical im-
position of marital norms on unmarried partnerships—at greater length else-
where. See generally Cahill, Regulating at the Margins, supra note 103.
107. Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26–30 (2012) (discussing the
law’s use of functional marriage tests generally as a way of determining who
ought to qualify for government benefits).
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Graves v. Estabrook, a case that addressed whether an unmarried
cohabitant could recover under the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress for the death of her fiance´, illustrates this phenome-
non.108 There, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s lack of a legal
or blood relationship to the victim barred recovery for the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress in New Hampshire, which, the de-
fendant maintained, rejected bystander liability for injuries to de
facto, as opposed to de jure, family members.109 Because the plaintiff
was at most a de facto family member of the victim, the defendant
reasoned, her emotional distress claim must necessarily fail.110
In reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for
failure to satisfy the relatedness prong of her emotional distress tort,
the court held that the class of plaintiffs eligible to bring that tort in
New Hampshire included unmarried cohabitants who in effect approx-
imated legal spouses.111 To determine whether unmarried cohabi-
tants in any given case satisfied that standard, the court continued,
lower courts ought to consider “the duration of the relationship, the
degree of mutual dependence, the extent of common contributions to a
life together, [and] the extent and quality of shared experience.”112
More specifically, courts ought to look at whether cohabitants had a
“relationship that [was] stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually
supportive . . . cemented by strong emotional bonds and provid[ing] a
deep and pervasive emotional security.”113 The court concluded that
because the victim and plaintiff’s lengthy relationship exhibited these
qualities, the latter was eligible to recover under New Hampshire’s
negligent infliction of emotional distress tort.114
Graves exemplifies the first aspect of marital supremacy as under-
stood by this Article because it evaluates non-marriage in the image of
ideal marriage and requires the former to look like the latter to re-
ceive protection. Professor Courtney Joslin cites Graves as an example
of a case that abandons “a bright line marriage rule” in favor of a func-
tional test that is more accommodating of non-marriage.115 While
technically true, Graves nevertheless incorporates an ideal image of
marriage into that functional test,116 thereby effectively importing
108. Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255 (N.H. 2003).
109. See id. at 1258.
110. See id. at 1259.
111. See id. at 1261–62.
112. Id. at 1262 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97
B.U. L. REV. 425, 487 (2017).
116. See Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985, 2017
(2015) (arguing that “[e]ven as family law doctrine has attempted to respond to
the changing nature of family life, certain truths remain fixed as bedrock princi-
ples that subtly—and not so subtly—inform the work of judges and legislatures”).
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marriage into its performative evaluation of non-marriage and using
the “vernacular of marriage” to appraise non-marriage.117 Did the co-
habitants in Graves mutually depend on each other?118 Was their re-
lationship “stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive . . .
cemented by strong emotional bonds”?119 In asking these and related
questions, Graves effectively places non-marriage in the shadow of
what it conceives to be the ideal marriage. In so doing, it accommo-
dates non-marriage by protecting the legal rights of its members, but
only to the extent that non-marriage approximates normative
marriage.
Graves also exemplifies the second aspect of marital supremacy as
understood by this Article because it subjects non-marriage not just to
marital ideals but to marital ideals from which legal marriage is actu-
ally exempt. For instance, the Graves court considered the plaintiff
and her fiance´ to be in a relationship akin to marriage because they
had a “deep and pervasive bond,” were “mutually supportive,” and
made extensive “common contributions to a life together.”120 We
might assume—and even hope—that married persons do these things,
but the law does not require them to do so in order to be married and
receive the benefits that legal marriage affords. Indeed, in other cases
like Graves, courts have considered whether non-marital couples’ rela-
tionships were marked by continuous cohabitation, the intermingling
of finances, and the maintenance of joint bank accounts.121 One court
even considered whether each non-marital partner “maintained his or
her own career and financial independence,”122 finding that because
they did maintain such independence they were not in a “stable, mari-
tal-like relationship” deserving of protection.123
Joslin also recognizes that functional tests of the kind employed by the Graves
court often reinforce marital norms by making legal protection contingent on ap-
proximating ideal marriage. See Joslin, supra note 115, at 487 (recognizing that
“while there may be some situations where a court may conclude that the refusal
to extend marital protections to unmarried individuals is unconstitutional, this is
likely only where those unmarried individuals are living in a way that looks a lot
like that of a marital family”).
117. Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, supra note 102, at 665.
118. Graves, 818 A.2d at 1262.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770–71 (Wash. 2000) (listing
these and other factors when determining whether unmarried cohabitants were
in a marriage-like relationship deserving of legal protection). For an analysis of
Pennington and other cases, see Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, supra note
17, at 17 (arguing that some lower courts have “import[ed] the characteristics of
marriage into a nonmarital relationship wholesale”).
122. Pennington, 14 P.3d at 772.
123. Id. at 772–73. This particular requirement—the financial dependence and inter-
mingling requirement—is especially interesting in light of the fact that more and
more married couples choose to maintain financial independence within mar-
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The point here is that marital supremacy does not just subject non-
marriage to marital ideals—it subjects non-marriage to marital ideals
that do not apply to most marriages and that may not adequately de-
scribe most marriages today.124 As Professor Albertina Antognini has
recently observed, “some [courts] impose even stricter requirements
[on unmarried persons] than those that exist in a marriage.”125 Her
analysis of non-marriage case law suggests that courts use “the
nonmarital relationship to enforce traditional marital values,”126 but
not necessarily actual marital requirements. On this account, marital
supremacy applies marital ideals to non-marital relationships in a se-
lective and asymmetrical way, holding non-marriage to a much higher
marital standard than actual marriage.
riage. See, e.g., Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Aboli-
tion and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483,
538 (2007) (observing that “courts seem to use a very traditional model for mar-
riage for determining whether a cohabitant relationship is enough like marriage
to provide shared property rights,” and “[t]hat model, a long-term relationship
with intertwined financial affairs, differs significantly from many marriages to-
day,” which “are very often short-term with separate finances”); Family Finances,
Separate Accounts Save a Love Life, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2003), https://www.the
guardian.com/money/2003/feb/08/familyfinance.valentinesday2003 [https://per
ma.unl.edu/33DE-7UW3].
124. An exception here is immigration law, which requires certain legal marriages—
marriages between citizens and non-citizens—to satisfy the law’s ideal marriage.
See Abrams, supra note 107, at 4. In addition, functional tests often subject non-
traditional familial relationships to more stringent standards than those imposed
on traditional familial relationships. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Quacking
Like a Duck?: Functional Parenthood Doctrine and Same-Sex Parents, 92 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 135, 169 n.156 (2017) (arguing that functional parent or de facto
parent tests subject non-traditional parents to parental norms and ideals from
which traditional genetic or marital parents are completely exempt); Clare Hunt-
ington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (2013) (revealing the marital
and familial ideals that the law incorporates into functional or performative
tests); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 400–09 (2012) (arguing that the law has tradition-
ally protected unmarried fathers only to the extent that they functioned accord-
ing to the law’s ideal marital father); Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005) (arguing that formal marriage provides a performative
freedom within marriage that functional marriage tests do not provide); Mary
Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal
History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643 (1993) (ar-
guing that functional analyses of same-sex couples’ relationships historically re-
quired them to approximate the ideal marriage).
125. Antognini, Nonmarital Exceptionalism, supra note 18, at 55 (emphasis added).
For instance, in the alimony termination context, some jurisdictions terminate an
obligee’s alimony if he or she is in a relationship akin to marriage. One court
interpreted a relationship “akin to marriage” as one where the obligee and her
partner were not separated for “even one night”—clearly not a requirement that
the law imposes on married persons. See id. For the case, see McKinney v.
Pedery, 776 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 2015).
126. Antognini, Nonmarital Exceptionalism, supra note 18, at 60 (emphasis added).
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Graves, of course, does not exhaust the field of the law’s treatment
of non-marriage.127 It does, however, illustrate what scholars have
identified as a trend in the law surrounding it: the modeling of non-
marriage on ideal marriage and the use of marital ideals as the “yard-
stick,”128 “metric,”129 or template for non-marriage. Most important
here, Graves illustrates by way of analogy what section III.B now ar-
gues is a parallel dynamic: sexual supremacy.
B. Sexual Supremacy and Contemporary ART Law
Just as marital supremacy frustrates the possibility of a world af-
ter marriage, sexual supremacy frustrates the possibility of a world
after sex. Borrowing from scholars’ treatment of marital supremacy,
this section turns to the persistence of norms about sexual reproduc-
tion in the legal regulation of non-sexual reproduction. It calls this
dynamic sexual supremacy and reveals the work that it is doing today
in the law’s engagement with non-sexual procreation. As this section
reveals, the presence of sexual supremacy in the law’s contemporary
engagement with ART destabilizes predictions about ART enabling
the “end of sex” and getting us to a point after sex in reproduction.
Subsection III.B.1 uses surrogacy law and contemporary debates
over gamete donation to show that the law models non-sexual repro-
duction on the ideal sexual family, that is, on the family ideally associ-
ated with sexual procreation. Subsection III.B.2 uses debates over
designer children to show that the law models non-sexual reproduc-
tion on the ideal sexual procreative process. Both subsections illus-
trate how ideas and ideals about sexual procreation constitute the
127. An earlier case exemplifying the two aspects of marital supremacy described here
is Braschi v. Stahl Associates, a landmark gay rights case. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc.
Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). There, the New York Court of Appeals had to
determine whether two men were in a marriage-like relationship for the purpose
of receiving certain protections under New York City’s law dealing with rent evic-
tion protection. It concluded that because the two men sufficiently acted like a
married couple—by, for instance, intermingling finances and being in an exclu-
sive and long-term relationship—they qualified for the protection. See id. at
50–55. In so doing, the court viewed non-marriage through not just a marital
frame, but a marital frame that is not required of most marriages, as most mar-
riages do not need to be long-term or financially interdependent in order to re-
ceive legal protection. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of
Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1018 (2000) (arguing that Braschi “rein-
forces . . . the persistent, transhistorical power of marriage as an institution that
orders our understanding of all domestic unions, marital and nonmarital”); id. at
1021 (arguing that the Braschi test “reinforces the social norms of traditional,
marital behavior” but not necessarily the legal norms of formal marriage).
128. Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, supra note 17, at 11.
129. Id. at 59.
2018] AFTER SEX 27
“vernacular”130 with which the law so often speaks about alternative
reproduction.
1. The Sexual Family: Surrogacy and Gamete Donor Anonymity
Surrogacy law and contemporary legal debates over egg and sperm
donor anonymity exemplify sexual supremacy because each molds, or
attempts to mold, ART in the shadow of sexual procreation and the
sexual family. Before looking more closely at this dynamic, a brief ex-
planation of the “sexual family” and its relationship to sexual
supremacy is helpful.
A “foundational institution,”131 the sexual family is “the appropri-
ate family . . . founded on the heterosexual couple—a reproductive,
biological pairing that is designated as divinely ordained in religion,
crucial in social policy, and a normative imperative in ideology.”132
Martha Fineman explains that the sexual family is “tenaciously or-
ganized around a sexual affiliation between a man and woman”133
and necessarily involves “a sexual tie” between that family’s par-
ents.134 Indeed, the “sexual tie” between two opposite-sex parents con-
stitutes the sexual family’s “primary intimate connection.”135
Fineman’s sexual family is the family organized around
(hetero)sexual procreation. In this sense, Fineman’s sexual family re-
calls anthropologist’s David Schneider’s understanding of American
kinship as rooted in the “figure” of sexual intercourse—a “figure [that]
provides all of the central symbols of American kinship.”136 “Sexual
intercourse (the act of procreation),” Schneider writes, “is the symbol
which provides the distinctive features in terms of which . . . the mem-
bers of the family as relatives and the family as a cultural unit [in the
United States] are defined and differentiated.”137 Sexual intercourse
constitutes the “fact of nature on which the cultural construct of the
[American] family is based,”138 he continues.
130. Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, supra note 102, at 665.
131. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that “the ‘sexual family’ has been invested
by our culture and society with exclusive legitimacy—it is the foundational insti-
tution”); see also id. at 145 (arguing that “[t]he pervasiveness of the sexual-fam-
ily-as-natural imagery qualifies it as a ‘metanarrative’—a narrative transcending
disciplines and crossing social divisions to define and direct discourses”).
132. Id. at 145.
133. Id. at 143.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 143.
136. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 1, at 37.
137. Id. at 31.
138. Id. at 37. Leon Kass gives this same idea a more normative bent when he states
that “[h]uman societies virtually everywhere have structured child-rearing re-
sponsibilities and systems of identity . . . on the bases of” sexual reproduction.
Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of
Humans, NEW REPUBLIC 17, 21 (1997). “What would kinship be without [sexual
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For Fineman as for Schneider, American kinship—and the law
that regulates it—is organized around the fact and act of procreative
sex. For instance, the sexual family is marital because historically sex
had to be marital in order to be legal.139 Moreover, the sexual family
is biological because successful sexual reproduction necessarily results
in a child biologically related to the two members who are engaged in
it.140 Finally, the sexual family is gendered—“[t]he sexual family rep-
resents the most gendered of our social institutions,”141 Fineman
writes—because sexual reproduction involves a “biological pairing”142
of men and women whose gender is presumed to flow naturally and
inevitably from their biological sex.143
This Article understands sexual supremacy as the law’s privileging
of just the kind of family described by Fineman and Schneider: the
sexual family, at once biological, gendered, marital, procreative, and,
of course, sexual. The sexual family informs the law of surrogacy,
which prioritizes sexually-produced kinship and its attendant attrib-
utes. The sexual family also animates debates surrounding gamete do-
nor anonymity, an alternative reproductive practice that is permitted
in the United States, but whose abolition is supported by a growing
number of commentators who criticize it for not looking enough like
the sexually-produced family.144
procreation]?,” Kass wonders. Id. at 21; see also THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY 101
(2002) (“Societies around the world have structured social and economic responsi-
bilities around the relationship between the generations established through sex-
ual procreation, and have developed modes of child-rearing, family responsibility,
and kinship behavior that revolve around the natural facts of begetting.”). Gen-
der relations, social kinship and familial relationships, in Kass’s view, flow inexo-
rably from “the natural facts of begetting”—that is, from sex. Id. at 101. Leon
Kass was Chairman of the Council when it issued its 2002 report on human
cloning.
139. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 146 (observing that “marriage is constructed as essen-
tial, not only the foundational relationship of the nuclear [sexual] family but the
very basis of society itself”); id. (observing that “marriage has historically been so
venerated as to become a ‘sacred’ institution, the archetype of legitimate inti-
macy”); id. (observing that “[i]n law, marriage traditionally has been designated
as the only legitimate sexual relationship”).
140. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 1, at 39 (observing that in American
culture “the child brings together and unifies in one person the different bioge-
netic substances of both parents”).
141. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 149.
142. Id. at 2.
143. See Kass, supra note 138, at 23 (stating that “[i]n natural procreation, human
beings come together, complementarily male and female, to give existence to an-
other being” (emphasis added)).
144. For the presence of sexual supremacy and the sexual family in other contexts
relating to the family, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Where do Black Children Belong?:
The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991); Baker,
supra note 124. Professor Bartholet reveals some aspects of the sexual family,
like biologism and genetic essentialism, in adoption law, and Professor Baker
2018] AFTER SEX 29
a. Surrogacy Law
Surrogacy law embodies sexual supremacy because it privileges
and prioritizes biology, gender, and marriage—three features associ-
ated with, and integral to, traditional sexual procreation and the sex-
ual family.145 Consider in this regard surrogacy law’s privileging and
preservation of biology, perhaps the most obvious feature of sexual
procreation and sexually-produced kinship.146 Some states explicitly
condition surrogacy on biology by requiring both of the intended par-
ents to a surrogacy agreement to be biologically related to any child
reveals some aspects of the sexual family in the de facto parent doctrine, which
prioritizes understandings of parentage that are sexual in nature as well as
“heteronormative, dyadic, and often genetic.” Baker, supra note 124, at 168.
Baker argues that the de facto parent doctrine makes sex and intimacy relevant
to parentage determinations even though sex is no longer necessary to conceive
children. See id.
145. Surrogacy law represents a patchwork of possibilities in the United States. Some
states expressly prohibit surrogacy, some expressly allow it, and others leave it
unaddressed either in part or in full. For an exhaustive overview, see REPORT OF
THE COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC, SURROGACY LAW
AND POLICY LAW IN THE U.S.: A NATIONAL CONVERSATION (2016). In addition, sig-
nificant jurisdictional variety exists within those states that allow surrogacy ei-
ther by statute or through case law, with some states, like California, permitting
both gestational and full surrogacy, and others, like New Hampshire, permitting
gestational surrogacy only. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7960–7962; N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 168-B. Even though legal requirements that prioritize biology, gender, and
marriage are the most obvious examples of sexual supremacy in surrogacy law,
they are not the only ones. Consider some states’ requirement that the intended
parents of a surrogacy agreement be unable to achieve successful procreation sex-
ually before turning to surrogacy as a method of kinship creation. A requirement
in several states, the ‘surrogacy only if sex fails’ reflects sexual supremacy by
effectively requiring couples to achieve parenthood through sexual procreation
before turning to surrogacy, thereby prioritizing sexual over non-sexual repro-
duction. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801. Two Utah men have recently
brought a federal constitutional challenge to the provision of Utah’s surrogacy
law that requires at least one of the intended parents to a surrogacy agreement to
be a “mother,” therefore precluding two men from using surrogacy (in Utah) to
form a family. Complaint, In Re Gestational Agreement (No. 20160796-SC)
(Utah, Jan. 18, 2017). As this section argues below, Utah’s commissioning mother
provision embodies sexual supremacy by making gender relevant to the surro-
gacy process. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. But in the very process
of challenging one aspect of sexual supremacy, the men reinforce another. In
their Complaint, the men argue that a legislative objective of Utah’s surrogacy
law is “that married couples capable of producing their own genetic children nat-
urally do so” before turning to surrogacy. Complaint supra, at 24 (emphasis ad-
ded). “As married same-sex male couples cannot naturally have their own
children,” they continue, “there is a medical necessity as they are ‘unable to bear
a child’ requiring gestational surrogacy.” Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly,
then, even as the men’s constitutional challenge attempts to disrupt or dislodge
some aspects of sexual supremacy in surrogacy law (the commissioning mother
requirement), it not only preserves others but relies on them when making con-
stitutional arguments (the sex before surrogacy requirement).
146. See SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 1, at 39.
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that results from that agreement. In Louisiana, North Dakota, and
Tennessee, for instance, only opposite-sex couples can create children
through gestational surrogacy, and they can only do so by using their
own eggs and sperm.147 Other states require genetic relatedness by at
least one of the intended parents. Surrogacy law in Florida,148 New
Hampshire,149 and Virginia,150 for example, requires that at least one
of the intended parents to a gestational surrogacy agreement be ge-
netically related to the child carried by the surrogate; if neither in-
tended parent is genetically related to that child, then the surrogate is
deemed the child’s legal mother.151
The genetic relatedness requirement also emerges in federal immi-
gration law. Under the State Department’s interpretation of a certain
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a child born abroad
to unmarried citizens (or to an unmarried citizen) of the United States
acquires United States citizenship at birth if, among other things, the
child has a genetic connection to at least one of the parents.152 Under
this provision, if the unmarried intended parents to a child born
abroad to a non-domestic surrogate use donor eggs and sperm, then
they cannot convey their United States citizenship to that child upon
birth. Similarly, if an unmarried woman has children abroad through
IVF with donor eggs and sperm, then she cannot convey United States
citizenship to them upon birth.153 Indeed, the United States has re-
cently denied a citizenship application brought by a same-sex male
couple on behalf of their children born abroad to a surrogate with do-
nor eggs on the ground that both twins did not share a genetic rela-
147. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718 (2016) (requiring that the intended couple to a gesta-
tional surrogacy agreement “create the child using only their own gametes”);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 (2009) (recognizing the intended parents of gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements only when “the embryo is conceived by using the egg
and sperm of the intended parents”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48) (2016)
(contemplating gestational surrogacy when the embryo results from the “wife’s
egg and husband’s sperm” but still providing that the statute “shall [not] be con-
strued to expressly authorize the surrogate birth process”).
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(3)(e) (“The gestational surrogate agrees to assume pa-
rental rights and responsibilities for the child born to her if it is determined that
neither member of the commissioning couple is the genetic parent of the child”).
149. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168 B:1 XII (defining “surrogacy” as “any arrangement by
which a woman agrees to be impregnated using either the intended father’s
sperm, the intended mother’s egg, or their preembryo”).
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(E)(3) (2016).
151. See supra notes 148–150.
152. INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)).
153. Joanna L. Grossman, Flag-Waving Gametes: Biology, Not Gestation or Parenting,
Determines Whether Children Born Abroad Acquire Citizenship from U.S. Citizen
Parents, VERDICT (Apr. 3, 2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012/04/03/flag-wav-
ing-gametes [https://perma.unl.edu/X34K-R8E2] (discussing the case of an un-
married American woman who had children in Israel through in vitro
fertilization with donor eggs and donor sperm, and the United States’ denial of
citizenship to her children).
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tionship to the citizen parent—as only one of the men was a United
States citizen and the couple fertilized the eggs with each of their
sperm, some of which derived from the non-citizen parent.154 As with
state law, then, federal law’s understanding of legal kinship in some
contexts effectively ‘follows the gametes.’
No less than it privileges biology and genetic relatedness, surro-
gacy law also privileges gender, a second and related aspect of the sex-
ual family. As mentioned above, surrogacy law in some jurisdictions,
like Louisiana, implicitly rests on dual-gender parenting by requiring
the married intended parents to use their own gametes—a require-
ment that assumes gender complementarity in parenting and one that
married same-sex couples cannot satisfy.155 Even more, the law in
several states requires either that a surrogacy agreement include a
commissioning mother in order to be valid or that the commissioning
mother use her own eggs, rather than donor eggs, to create the child
carried by the surrogate.156 In other words, surrogacy law sometimes
requires the intended family to include a mother and, in many cases, a
mother who is genetically related to the child.
Consider here Florida, Texas, and Utah, which all require that at
least one of the intended parents to a surrogacy agreement be a wo-
man—thus excluding both single men and male same-sex couples—by
providing that there must be a “commissioning mother” to such an
agreement for a court to validate it.157 Currently the subject of a fed-
eral constitutional challenge, Utah’s commissioning mother require-
ment was cited by a court as a reason to refuse validation of a
surrogacy agreement between a surrogate and two married men—the
latter of whom, the court claimed, could not satisfy Utah’s “intending
mother” requirement. No state has a parallel requirement that a sur-
rogacy agreement involve a “commissioning father.”158
154. The United States’ denial of citizenship to both children is currently the subject
of a federal lawsuit, which claims that the denial unconstitutionally treats the
two men, who are married, as if they were unmarried. See Complaint at 2–3,
Banks v. U.S. Dep’t o State, U.S. Dist. No. 2:18-cv-00523 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22,
2018).
155. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718 (2016) (requiring that the intended couple to a gesta-
tional surrogacy agreement “create the child using only their own gametes”).
NeJaime argues that Louisiana’s surrogacy law “entail[s] both a rejection of
same-sex family formation and an appeal to dual-gender parenting.” NeJaime,
The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2325.
156. For a list of these states, see NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at
2376–81.
157. See id.
158. Some states, though, as mentioned above, do require that one of the commission-
ing parents be a man by requiring that the intended parents use their own ga-
metes to create a child through surrogacy. See supra note 147 and accompanying
text.
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Similarly, consider the laws of numerous states that provide that
an intended mother to a gestational surrogacy agreement must use
her own egg, rather than a donor egg, in order for the agreement to be
valid.159 In these states, if the intended mother lacks a genetic connec-
tion to the child because she uses a donor egg, then the surrogate,
rather than the intended mother, is the legal mother upon the child’s
birth.160 States with these genetic relatedness requirements have
foisted legal parenthood on a surrogate against her will upon the birth
of a child,161 and have refused to recognize gestational surrogacy
agreements between surrogate women and same-sex male couples,162
or single men,163 on the theory that the children who result from those
agreements will be left “motherless.”164 No state has a parallel re-
quirement that an intended father’s sperm be used to create a child in
order to declare him the child’s legal father. To the contrary, states
have consistently used legal mechanisms like the paternal presump-
tion in order to extend legal paternity to men who lack a genetic con-
nection to their children.165
These gender-based requirements hearken back in different ways
to the sexual family. The dual-gender requirement hearkens back to
the sexual family because that requirement enforces gender comple-
mentarity in parenting, a foundational assumption on which the sex-
ual family rests.166 More subtly, the commissioning mother and
genetic mother requirements hearken back to the sexual family be-
cause they assume that parentage necessarily includes not just a
mother, but a mother who is genetically related to her children—the
latter of which recalls a time when children were only the result of
sexual procreation. Historically, all children had genetic maternity
but not necessarily genetic paternity because all children were the re-
sult of sex.167 The law has internalized this idea—the certainty of ge-
159. For a list of these states, see NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at
2376–81.
160. See id. at 2309 (stating that in most states, “[t]he gestational surrogate, who is
not the legal mother when the intended mother is the genetic mother, is the legal
mother when the intended mother uses a donor egg”).
161. See id. at 2311.
162. See id. at 2312–14 (discussing these cases).
163. See, e.g., In re M.M.M., 428 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (refusing to uphold a
surrogacy agreement between a single man and a surrogate).
164. See, e.g., A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
3250 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009) (refusing to terminate the rights of a
surrogate who entered into a surrogacy contract with two married men on the
ground that recognizing the contract would leave the children without a mother).
165. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2315–16 (discussing
fatherhood’s social dimensions).
166. See FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 149.
167. The law has long conceptualized fatherhood in both biological and social terms
through mechanisms like the paternal presumption, which in some states conclu-
sively treated the husband of the birth mother as the father of the child. The law
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netic maternity over the uncertainty of genetic paternity—by
continuing to justify the differential treatment of mothers and fathers
across doctrinal domains,168 even in an alternative reproductive era
where sex is not the only way to create children and where maternity
is not always certain based on the act of giving birth.169
It could be, then, that some jurisdictions continue to require surro-
gacy contracts to include mothers who have a genetic link to their chil-
dren not just because those jurisdictions are implicitly (or explicitly)
motivated by sex stereotypes—which they are.170 Rather, or in addi-
has grounded (and continues to ground) motherhood, however, principally in biol-
ogy. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2314.
168. Such domains include, among others, immigration law and adoption law involv-
ing unwed fathers. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
169. Numerous examples of contested maternity exist in the law, particularly in light
of advances in reproductive medicine that permit maternity to be split or shared
between (and among) multiple players, including an egg donor, a gestational car-
rier, and an intended mother. Courts have been considering the question of ‘who
is the mother’ in these contested maternity cases for years, starting with the first
high profile surrogacy case, Baby M. See  In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1988) (holding that an intended non-genetic mother was not the legal mother of a
child born to a surrogate who was genetically related to the child). In the wake of
Baby M., courts considered the question of ‘who is the mother’ in surrogacy cases
involving gestational carriers and intended genetic mothers. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that an intended genetic mother was
the legal mother of a child born through a gestational surrogacy agreement and
using intent to resolve the question of legal maternity in the context of gesta-
tional surrogacy). More recently, courts have considered the question of ‘who is
the mother’ in cases involving two women in a relationship who engage in collab-
orative reproduction together. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005)
(holding that two women were the legal mothers of twins born to the couple, one
of whom was the genetic parent and the other of whom was the gestational par-
ent). While the question of contested maternity is beyond the scope of this Article
and the subject of future work by its author, suffice it to say that surrogacy law’s
privileging of motherhood generally, and of genetic motherhood specifically, is
based on an erroneous assumption: that maternity, unlike paternity, is invaria-
bly certain and assured. While that assumption might make sense in the context
of sexual reproduction, which guarantees that the woman carrying and birthing
the child is the child’s genetic mother, it makes less sense in the context of non-
sexual reproduction, which permits the bifurcation of maternity between (and
even among) several players. Indeed, if anything, non-sexual reproduction makes
maternity even more uncertain and contested than paternity, given that ART
permits the distribution of maternity among at the very least three players (egg
donor, gestational surrogate, intended mother) but the distribution of paternity
between only, at the very least, two players (sperm donor, intended father).
170. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2329 (arguing that sur-
rogacy law’s “construction of parenthood situates women as biologically con-
nected not only to reproduction but also to child-rearing” and that “[w]hile
biological fathers can be displaced by men and women who lack biological ties,
the law attempts to ensure the biological mother’s presence”); id. (characterizing
laws that embody “[v]iews that tie motherhood to biology” as “stereotypes” that
“negatively affect women” as well as “men by viewing fatherhood as derivative of
motherhood and secondary as a parental role”).
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tion, some jurisdictions require genetic maternity for surrogacy con-
tracts to be valid because they are modeling surrogacy on paradigms
of sexual procreation. Those paradigms, which inform the law of sur-
rogacy just as they inform the law of immigration and the law of un-
wed fathers, have long assumed that genetic maternity, unlike genetic
paternity, is definite and assured.171
In addition to biology and gender, surrogacy law in the United
States reflects a third core feature of the sexually-conceived family:
marriage. Several of the states that recognize some form of surrogacy
either by statute or through case law require two intended parents for
a surrogacy agreement to be legal; moreover, those two intended par-
ents must be married to each other. The surrogacy laws of Florida,
New Hampshire, Nevada, Texas, and Utah contain such a
requirement.172
As explained earlier, marriage is a feature of the sexual family
given that traditionally only married people could have sex and there-
fore reproduce. States that retain a marriage requirement for surro-
gacy and for other forms of alternative reproduction, like alternative
insemination,173 appear to suggest that because “marriage tradition-
ally [was] designated as the only legitimate sexual relationship,”
states today may designate it as the only legitimate reproductive rela-
tionship.174 If that is right, then states are imposing a marital norm
traditionally applied in the sexual procreative context to non-sexual
procreation, even though the act that precipitated that norm—procre-
ative intercourse—no longer applies. Indeed, if, as some historians
have argued, part of the stated reason for laws requiring sex to be
marital was to ensure that the paternity of children was known, then
it makes little sense to apply that norm to non-sexual reproduction,
including surrogacy, where paternity is always known ex ante—if it
even exists at all.175
Professor Douglas NeJaime has recently argued that the three at-
tributes of traditional sexual procreation and the sexual family identi-
fied here—marriage, biology, and gender—continue to inform
171. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
172. For a list of these states, see NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at
2376–81.
173. See, e.g., id. at 2296 (observing that under “the laws of many states, sperm donors
are divested of rights and responsibilities only if they donate sperm for use by a
married woman”); Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children (?): Marriage, Gender,
and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1187 n.42 (2010)
(observing that while “states generally permit [single mother] families to be
formed [through alternative insemination],” they “for the most part . . . exclude
children born into these families from the relevant parentage provisions”).
174. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 146 (emphasis added).
175. See, e.g., KELLY A. RYAN, REGULATING PASSION: SEXUALITY AND PATRIARCHAL
RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1700–1830, at 24 (2014).
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parentage law in ways “that carry forward legacies of inequality em-
bedded in frameworks forged in earlier eras.”176 Even as the “law in-
creasingly accommodates [the non-biological] families formed through
ART,”177 NeJaime explains, it simultaneously “approach[es] the pa-
rental claims of women and same-sex couples within existing
frameworks organized around marital and biological relation-
ships.”178 In so doing, he says, modern ART law “reproduce[s] some of
the very gender- and sexuality-based asymmetries embedded in those
frameworks.”179 Through an exhaustive analysis of the law’s treat-
ment of parentage resulting from marriage, alternative insemination,
egg and sperm donation, and surrogacy, NeJaime reveals the perse-
verance of “the gender-differentiated, heterosexual family”180 in the
so-called “new kinship,”181 and prescribes its reappraisal on norma-
tive and constitutional grounds.182
While NeJaime does not explicitly say so, the attributes animating
contemporary ART law that he identifies collectively compose the fam-
ily traditionally associated with sexual intercourse. NeJaime urges us
to consider the extent to which ART law, even as it modernizes par-
entage and facilitates non-traditional family formation, reinforces the
heterosexual family by continuing to prioritize marriage, biology, and
gender.183 Agreeing with NeJaime’s analysis and recommendation,
this Article further argues that we should consider the extent to which
ART law, including surrogacy law, reinforces sexual supremacy by
privileging reproductive sex and the kind of family that reproductive
sex is presumed to create.
In addition to exhibiting the first aspect of sexual supremacy de-
tailed earlier—the use of norms related to sexual procreation to regu-
late the practice of non-sexual reproduction—surrogacy law also
176. NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2289.
177. Id. at 2260.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2268.
181. Professor Naomi Cahn uses this term to describe the family created through
ART. NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMI-
LIES 129 (2012).
182. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2347–59.
183. See id. at 2260 (arguing that “the gender-differentiated, heterosexual family con-
tinu[es] to structure marital parenthood”); id. at 2290 (arguing that “the law has
accommodated same-sex parenting within a framework shaped by the gender-
differentiated, heterosexual family—recognizing nonbiological parents in mar-
ried same-sex couples to the extent they satisfy criteria used to identify legal
fathers”); id. at 2325 (observing that surrogacy law continues to prioritize “biolog-
ical ties that allow for the maintenance of the gender-differentiated, heterosexual
family”); id. at 2260 (contending that “gender- and sexuality-based asymmetries
remain embedded in the law of parental recognition”).
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exhibits the second aspect of sexual supremacy: the asymmetrical ap-
plication of those norms to non-sexual procreation.
For example, some states require that the intended parents to a
surrogacy agreement be married. No state, however, requires any per-
son to be married in order to sexually reproduce. Similarly, some
states effectively require the intended parents of a surrogacy agree-
ment to engage in dual-gender parenting (or assume that they will) by
recognizing surrogacy contracts only when the intended parents to
such contracts are of the opposite sex.184 No state, however, requires
existing parents of any kind to engage in dual-gender parenting, and
no state requires prospective parents to prove dual-gender parenting
prior to engaging in reproductive intercourse. Finally, some states re-
quire surrogacy agreements to include a woman or mother—thereby
foreclosing single men or male same-sex couples from using surro-
gacy—on the theory that women engage in mothering, that only wo-
men engage in mothering, and that children should not be born into
motherless families.185 No state, however, requires women who have
children through sexual procreation to show that they can—or want
to—mother a child in any particular way, or even mother at all.
Much in the same way that states require unmarried persons to
satisfy marital ideals or scripts from which married persons are
largely, if not completely, exempt,186 then, states require non-sexual
procreators using surrogacy to satisfy procreative ideals or scripts
from which sexual procreators are largely, if not completely, ex-
empt.187 In both cases, the law regulates non-traditional kinship not
just in the shadow of a traditional form, but in the shadow of an ideal
traditional form—one from which traditional kinship is largely free.
b. Gamete Donor Anonymity
Unlike many of our peer countries, gamete donor anonymity is le-
gal in the United States, so no egg or sperm donor is required to reveal
identifying information to the child that she or he helps create. Even
so, there exists here today a “raging debate as to whether donor-con-
184. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 120–126 and accompanying text.
187. Professor Baker has identified a similar asymmetry in the de facto parent doc-
trine, which rewards dual-gender parenting even as “genetic parents are free to
gender their parenting or not.” Baker, supra note 124, at 169 n.156. Some states,
in fact, require a home study before a court will validate a surrogacy agreement.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801. In so doing, these states are imposing all
sorts of scripts and ideals on intended parents—scripts and ideals from which
children conceived sexually are largely exempt. As one court put it: “Parents are
not screened for the procreation of their own children”—not screened, that is, for
the sexual procreation of their own children. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998).
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ceived children have a right to know their origins”188 and, if so,
whether the United States should outlaw anonymity by mandating
non-anonymity in gamete donation. Conservative commentators ar-
gue that anonymous gamete donation facilitates the creation of chil-
dren who are deprived of their biological kin.189 Progressive
commentators who otherwise support alternative family formation ar-
gue that gamete donor anonymity violates donor-conceived children’s
ostensible “right to know” their genetic progenitors.190 The hope of all
of these commentators is that the United States will follow other coun-
tries’ lead and abolish the routine practice of anonymous gamete do-
nation,191 notwithstanding the negative effects that such laws would
almost certainly have on the reproductive practice of gamete
donation.192
Today’s controversy over gamete donor anonymity exhibits the two
aspects of sexual supremacy as understood by this Article: the use of
paradigms surrounding sexual procreation and the sexual family to
inform the law of ART, and the asymmetric application of those para-
digms to ART. As for the first aspect of sexual supremacy, consider the
role that biology and genetics play in the debate over gamete donor
anonymity. Opponents of anonymous donation routinely organize the
donor-conceived family around biology by arguing that anonymous do-
nation deprives donor-conceived children of knowledge about, and ac-
cess to, their biological kin. In so doing, they route non-sexual
reproduction through an essential feature of sexual procreation—biol-
ogy—and mold the non-sexual family in the image of the sexual
family.
The remarks of David Blankenhorn and others who advocate for
non-anonymity in gamete donation illustrate this point. An erstwhile
opponent of same-sex marriage who now supports that institution but
188. Cohen, supra note 22, at 527.
189. See infra notes 193–197 and accompanying text.
190. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
191. Countries that have abolished anonymity in gamete donation include Sweden
(the first country to do so in 1985), Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Austra-
lian states of Victoria and Western Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, the
United Kingdom, and New Zealand. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 500–02.
192. Scholars have discussed the adverse effects that a mandatory non-anonymity re-
gime would have on the practice of gamete donation, including decreased supply
and increased cost. See Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regulating
Family After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 203–05 (2015) (dis-
cussing the possibility that mandatory non-anonymity could have a chilling effect
on donation and increase the cost of donation); I. Glenn Cohen et al., Sperm Do-
nor Anonymity and Compensation: An Experiment with American Sperm Donors,
1 J.L. & BIOSCI. 1 (2016) (reporting the results of an empirical study suggesting
that mandatory non-anonymity could lead to the decreased supply and increased
cost of gametes); DAAR, supra note 4, at 171 (discussing Swedish doctors’ fears
about the effects of mandatory non-anonymity on gamete donation in that coun-
try in 1985).
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is skeptical about non-biological family formation outside of adop-
tion,193 Blankenhorn invokes biology when asking whether “gay[ ] and
straight people should think twice before denying children born
through artificial reproductive technology the right to know and be
known by their biological parents?”194 Blankenhorn’s colleagues at
the Institute for American Values echo these sentiments, arguing in
publications like My Daddy’s Name Is Donor195 and Do Mothers Mat-
ter?196 that gamete donation and surrogacy deliberately create “moth-
erless” and “fatherless” families as well as children who are bereft of
their “mothers” and “fathers.”197 Commentators who support alterna-
tive family formation but oppose anonymous donation similarly priori-
tize biological connection in family formation. They argue that gamete
donation creates “familial” networks and that the law ought to honor
those networks by abolishing donor anonymity and enabling connec-
tion between donor-conceived children and their biological “kin.”198
As in surrogacy law, debates over gamete donor anonymity ad-
vance sexual supremacy in the law’s engagement with ART because
they reinforce a key feature of the sexual family and sexual procrea-
tion: biology. By assuming that the persons involved in the donor net-
work are “family” and “familial” even though raised in different legal
households,199 and by advocating for what is effectively a mandatory
193. David Blankenhorn was also the “star witness” for the proponents of California’s
law prohibiting same-sex marriage in the 2010 federal trial over that law’s consti-
tutionality. Frank Rich, Two Weddings, a Divorce, and ‘Glee,’ N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/opinion/13rich.html.
194. David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES, (June
22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-mar
riage-changed.html; see also David Blankenhorn, The Rights of Children and the
Redefinition of Parenthood, (June 2, 2005) (arguing in his speech to the Danish
Institute for Human Rights that a child has the fundamental right to know both
of his or her biological parents, even when ART is used), http://americanvalues
.org/catalog/pdfs/family-humanrights.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/H43V-KRMX].
195. ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, NORVAL D. GLENN & KAREN CLARK, MY DADDY’S NAME IS
DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM DONATION
(2010), http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/Donor_FINAL.pdf.
196. Elizabeth Marquardt, Do Mothers Matter?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10 2012), http://www
.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/02/do-mothers-matter/252676/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/N5V8-MS7M] [hereinafter Marquardt, Do Mothers Matter?]; Eliza-
beth Marquardt, Sperm Donor Kids Speak Out: Our Biological Dads Matter to
Us, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-
marquardt/anonymouslyconceived-youn_b_810463.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
N4HJ-BVER]; Karen Clark & Elizabeth Marquardt, The Sperm-Donor Kids Are
Not Really All Right, SLATE (June 14, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/double
_x/doublex/2010/06/the_spermdonor_kids_are_not_really_all_right.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/R56Q-UZR8].
197. See Marquardt, Do Mothers Matter?, supra note 196.
198. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 181; Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J.
367, 413 (2012).
199. See CAHN, supra note 181, at 137 (using the language of family to address indi-
viduals conceived from the same gametes but raised in different households).
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connection between some of them, arguments favoring the abolition of
anonymity in gamete donation presuppose that biology and genetics
necessarily create family. Scholars have argued that ART, by allowing
for the separation of biology, procreation, and legal parenthood, has
pushed law and society to think about the family in ways that super-
sede the paradigms that have long determined family law’s deep
structure.200 Arguments against donor anonymity reinforce that deep
structure by crowding out alternative conceptions of family formation
and replacing them with the defining characteristics of sexual
kinship.
Consider a second example of sexual supremacy in the gamete do-
nor anonymity debate: the argument that the rules of gamete dona-
tion ought to approximate the rules of sexual reproduction. This
argument has both extreme and less extreme forms. Its more extreme
form posits that the law ought to treat sexual and non-sexual
procreators equally by applying the rules of sexual reproduction to
non-sexual reproduction. On this telling, donors—and, specifically,
sperm donors—should not be allowed to waive their identity or their
legal obligations to any children that result from their donations to
single women since no man can waive his identity or his legal obliga-
tions to children resulting from sex, or, more precisely, sex with single
women.201
The less extreme form of the argument that non-sexual reproduc-
tion ought to approximate the norms of sexual reproduction—and the
one that predominates contemporary debates over gamete donor ano-
nymity—posits that donor-conceived children ought to enjoy the same
transparency with respect to parentage that sexually-conceived chil-
200. See, e.g., NeJaime, The New Parenthood, supra note 25, at 1230.
201. Professor Marsha Garrison is most closely allied with this position; in her view,
the rules that govern non-sexual reproduction ought to mimic the rules that gov-
ern sexual reproduction. See Marsha Garrison, Law-Making for Baby-Making:
An Interpretive Approach for Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 835 (2000). Garrison would not apply the rules of paternity and non-ano-
nymity to sperm donors who donate to women who are married to men. In that
context, the law would treat the husband of the recipient as the second legal par-
ent of the child and the sperm donor as a legal stranger. Garrison would, how-
ever, apply the paternity and non-anonymity rules to single women and female
same-sex couples who use donated sperm to reproduce. Id. at 896–97 (supporting
anonymous donation in cases involving married women and their husbands, so
long as their husbands consent); id. at 903 (opposing anonymous donation in
cases involving single women). In supporting paternity and non-anonymity for
single but not for heterosexual married women, Garrison’s proposals track sexual
procreation’s traditional rules, which mandated that the husbands of women who
conceived through adultery were presumed to be the fathers of those children—
and the sexual “sperm donors” legal strangers. On the application of the paternal
presumption in the context of same-sex procreation, see Susan Frelich Appleton,
Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex
Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2006).
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dren ostensibly enjoy. On this account, egg and sperm donors would
not necessarily have legal responsibility over any children that result
from their donations. They would, however, be required to reveal cer-
tain identifying information, including a name, to those children.202
Both of these arguments exemplify sexual supremacy because they
attempt to shape ART law in the shadow of the sexual family and sex-
ual procreation. In both cases, sexual procreation is the yardstick,
model, or metric for non-sexual procreation, and in both cases, what is
good for sexual conception is presumed to be good for non-sexual con-
ception. Both arguments prioritize the “heteronormative family struc-
tures”203 that are characteristic of Fineman’s sexual family, and both
bear out Schneider’s claim that reproductive intercourse is the “cen-
tral symbol”204 of American kinship—one that tends to absorb alter-
native family forms in its wake.
In addition to exemplifying the first aspect of sexual supremacy as
explained by this Article—the use of sexual procreative paradigms to
regulate alternative procreation—many of the arguments considered
by this subsection also exemplify its second aspect: the asymmetric
202. Professor Naomi Cahn is the most prominent legal scholar associated with this
argument, which animates many of her proposals in favor of mandatory non-ano-
nymity in gamete donation. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 198, at 413 (arguing that
“federal and state law should provide for limited disclosure of the donor’s identity
once offspring turn eighteen” and that such laws should “preempt private agree-
ments . . . to the contrary”); CAHN, supra note 181, at 129 (same); Naomi Cahn,
Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor Registry, 12
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE & L. 203 (2008) (advocating federal legislation that
would abolish gamete donor anonymity and establish a national mandatory do-
nor registry and presenting the need for such a registry, including accidental in-
cest prevention). Unlike Professor Garrison, Professor Cahn has never argued
that non-sexual reproduction ought to track the law of sexual reproduction. She
has, however, suggested that gamete donation ought to track the norms of sexual
reproduction regarding transparency in parentage. For example, in a recent arti-
cle, Professor Cahn argues that states should abolish anonymity in gamete dona-
tion and signal to donor-conceived children the origins of their conception by
marking their birth certificates “donor conceived.” Cahn, supra note 29, at 1100.
Noting that the biological non-paternity rate in sexual conception cases is about
5% whereas “in 100% of donor conception cases, the children have an unknown
biological parent,” Cahn, supra note 29, at 1117, Professor Cahn contends that
the law ought to make it possible for donor-conceived children to know the iden-
tity of their biological male progenitor—presumably to bring the non-paternity
rate in donor conception cases (which she says is “100%”) more in line with the
non-paternity rate in sexual conception cases (which she approximates is “5%”).
Professor Cahn’s proposal uses sexual conception as the metric or baseline for
donor conception because it assumes that donor-conceived children deserve the
same privilege or “right to know” their genetic progenitors that sexually-con-
ceived children enjoy.
203. Catherine Donovan, Genetics, Fathers and Families: Exploring the Implications
of Changing the Law in Favour of Identifying Sperm Donors, 15 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 494, 495 (2006).
204. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 1, at 53.
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application of ideals about sexual reproduction to non-sexual repro-
duction. Consider the argument that anonymous donation deprives
donor-conceived children of identifying information about their biolog-
ical progenitors. That argument rests on comparisons between sexual
conception and ART, but unsatisfyingly accounts for the fact that sex-
ually-conceived children are never guaranteed such information, as a
not insignificant number of sexually-conceived children lack accurate
information about their biological paternity, either because their par-
ents lied to them about it or were themselves mistaken about it.205 As
such, that argument exemplifies the second aspect of sexual
supremacy as understood by this Article because it advocates regulat-
ing ART in the shadow not just of sexual procreation, but of ideal sex-
ual procreation. In doing so, it recalls marital supremacy in non-
marriage regulation and sexual supremacy in surrogacy regulation.
As in those settings, proposed regulations of non-traditional kinship
(gamete donation) route it through paradigms and ideals about tradi-
tional kinship (sexual conception)—paradigms and ideals from which
traditional kinship is actually exempt.
205. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109
MICH. L. REV. 291, 315 n.106 (2010) (citing the most accurate misattributed pa-
ternity estimate as between 2–5% of the population); MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S
PROMISES: HOW FORMAL & INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES
61 (2015) (stating that “[w]hile urban legend holds that as many as 10 percent of
children are products of the mother’s extramarital affair, a 2006 study suggests
that mandatory genetic tests would unpleasantly surprise around 2 percent of
husbands”); Steve Olson, Who’s Your Daddy?: The Unintended Consequences of
Genetic Screening for Disease, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2007), http://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2007/07/who-s-your-daddy/305969/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/5B6U-E29A]. Professor Garrison recognizes this asymmetry, observing that
“contemporary family law strongly encourages unmarried women to establish the
paternity of their [sexually conceived] children, but does not mandate it.” Garri-
son, supra note 201, at 911. Professor Cahn does as well, noting that “in some
unknown percentage of [sexual conception] cases, children believe that a man is
their father but he is not actually biologically related to them.” Cahn, supra note
29, at 1116. Both scholars respond to those inconsistencies by arguing that the
state ought to—and may—regulate ART not according to the norms of sexual
reproduction as they actually exist, but according to the norms of sexual reproduc-
tion as they ideally exist. Professor Garrison states that “[alternative insemina-
tion] offers a context in which dual parenting could far more reliably be enforced
[than in sexual conception].” Garrison, supra note 201, at 912 (emphasis added).
Professor Cahn maintains that parental transparency is an ideal that the law
should strive for in all reproduction, but one that the law may asymmetrically
apply to ART given that sexual conception, unlike ART, involves “[the creation of
children] through intimate acts.” Cahn, supra note 29, at 1117. I have elsewhere
critiqued Cahn’s argument for assuming without explanation that ART is non-
intimate, that sexual conception is intimate, and that differential regulation of
ART and sexual procreation is constitutionally permissible. See Cahill, Reproduc-
tion Reconceived, supra note 2, at 655–85.
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2. The Sexual Procreative Process: Designer Children
The previous subsection focused on the family associated with sex-
ual procreation and on the way in which the law routes ART through
certain ideals about that family. This subsection now turns to the pro-
cess associated with sexual procreation and to the way in which the
law routes ART through certain ideals about that process.
Consider in this regard the longstanding criticism of alternative
reproduction as a process that incentivizes parents to “design” their
children in ethically unpalatable ways. The “designer baby” criticism
of ART has been leveled at sperm and egg donor selection,206 pre-im-
plantation genetic diagnosis,207 and human reproductive cloning.208 It
has more recently been invoked to express opposition to—and to jus-
tify the prohibition of—germline modification of human embryos
through technologies and procedures like CRISPR/Cas9 and mito-
chondrial donation, both of which have garnered considerable media
attention in the last year and both of which have been the recent tar-
get of designer baby criticism.209 The United States continues to ban
206. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 27, at 69–75; Julie Bindel, Designer Babies? It Looks
Like Racism and Eugenics to Me, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.theguar-
dian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/03/sperm-donot-lawsuit-racism-eugenics-lesbi
an-couple-black-donor [https://perma.unl.edu/G3RW-NNY5]; JuJu Chang &
Deborah Apton, Designing Babies? Embryos from ‘Ph.D. Sperm’ and ‘Attractive
Eggs’ For Sale, ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Life
Stages/story?id=2895615 [https://perma.unl.edu/F4RG-LS59]; Katharine Lowry,
The Designer Babies Are Growing Up: At Home with the First children of the ‘Ge-
nius’ Sperm Bank, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-11-
01/magazine/tm-17535_1_sperm-bank [https://perma.unl.edu/X368-NBRY];
David Plotz, The “Genius Babies,” and How They Grew, SLATE (Feb. 8, 2001),
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/seed/2001/02/the_genius_babies_and_how_they
_grew.html [https://perma.unl.edu/V3B8-KN5N].
207. See, e.g., Susannah Baruch, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental
Preferences: Beyond Deadly Disease, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 245 (2008);
Michael Gortakowski, A Parent’s Choice v. Governmental Regulations: A Bioethi-
cal Analysis in an Era of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 29 BUFF. PUB. INT.
L.J. 85 (2011); Bratislav Stankovic, “It’s a Designer Baby!”: Opinions on Regula-
tion of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3; Benjamin
B. Williams, Note, Screening for Children: Choice and Chance in the “Wild West”
of Reproductive Medicine, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1305 (2011).
208. See, e.g., Roger Highfield, New Cloning Method ‘Used to Make Designer Babies,’
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 14, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/science-
news/3339460/New-cloning-method-used-to-make-designer-babies.html.
209. CRISPR/Cas9 is a gene editing technology that allows geneticists to “cut” strands
of DNA at a specific site in the genome in order to delete (and correct) disease-
causing mutations that are heritable by future generations. See GREELY, supra
note 7, at 180–84. CRISPR/Cas9 stands, respectively, for “Clustered Regularly
Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats” (CRISPR) and the enzyme used in that
process. Id. at 180. Already used by Chinese scientists to alter disease-related
genes in both non-viable human embryos and adult humans, CRISPR/Cas9 made
headlines last summer when Nature reported that researchers in the United
States had used it to correct a disease-causing mutation in viable human em-
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both the public funding of, and clinical research involving, these two
technologies,210 notwithstanding their potential to enable family for-
bryos in a way that minimized threats to embryonic development that were previ-
ously a source of scientific and medical concern. Heidi Ledford, CRISPR Fixes
Disease Gene in Viable Human Embryos, NATURE (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.na-
ture.com/news/crispr-fixes-disease-gene-in-viable-human-embryos-1.22382
[https://perma.unl.edu/6FFU-HMK6]; see also Ewen Callaway, Second Chinese
Team Reports Gene Editing in Human Embryos, NATURE (Apr. 8, 2016), https://
www.nature.com/news/second-chinese-team-reports-gene-editing-in-human-em-
bryos-1.19718 [https://perma.unl.edu/F3WN-CJKN] (summarizing reports of Chi-
nese scientists editing genes of human embryos to make them more resistant to
HIV infection using CRISPR). Mitochondrial donation is a form of germline modi-
fication that eliminates heritable mitochondrial disorders through the use of egg
donor mitochondria. GREELY, supra note 7, at 160–61. Popularly known as “three-
parent IVF,” mitochondrial donation recently made headlines when it was re-
ported in 2016 that a U.S. fertility clinic with offices in Mexico had used it there
to create the first “three-parent” baby. See Sara Reardon, Genetic Details of Con-
troversial ‘Three-Parent Baby’ Revealed, NATURE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.na-
ture.com/news/genetic-details-of-controversial-three-parent-baby-revealed-
1.21761 [https://perma.unl.edu/P9XK-PM4B]. For an explanation of the proce-
dure by the doctor who developed it, see J. Zhang et al., First Live Birth Using
Human Oocytes Reconstituted by Spindle Nuclear Transfer for Mitochondrial
DNA Mutation Causing Leigh Syndrome, 106 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 375 (Oct.
19, 2016). On the designer baby critique of both CRISPR/Cas9 and mitochondrial
donation, see Michael le Page, Will CRISPR Gene-Editing Technology Lead to
Designer Babies?, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/
article/mg22830500-500-will-crispr-gene-editing-technology-lead-to-designer-ba-
bies/ [https://perma.unl.edu/XU75-CMJT]; Ellie Zolfagharaifard, Richard Gray &
Ben Spencer, Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos for the First Time:
Controversial Technique Could Lead to Designer Babies, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 22,
2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3051365; Rebecca Dimond,
Social and Ethical Issues in Mitochondrial Donation, 115 BRIT. MED. BULL. 173
(Sept. 3, 2015) (discussing slippery slope and designer baby fears in the context of
mitochondrial donation).
210. Federal law does not ban human embryo research in the United States—even as
some states do—but federal law does ban the federal funding of such research.
Specifically, the Dickey-Wicker Amendment prohibits the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services from funding any research relating to human em-
bryos, including research involving somatic and germline editing in human em-
bryos; these prohibitions apply to research involving mitochondrial donation
since mitochondrial donation involves germline modification and necessitates
pre-clinical research on human embryos. See A.L. Bredenoord & I. Hyun, The
Road to Mitochondrial Gene Transfer: Follow the Middle Lane, 23 MOLECULAR
THERAPY 975 (2015), http://www.cell.com/molecular-therapy-family/molecular-
therapy/fulltext/S1525-0016(16)30121-6; Sara Reardon, NIH Reiterates Ban on
Editing Human Embryo DNA, NATURE (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.nature.com/
news/nih-reiterates-ban-on-editing-human-embryo-dna-1.17452 [https://perma
.unl.edu/CJ62-AMLS] (stating that “the Dickey-Wicker amendment specifically
bans the government from funding work that destroys human embryos or creates
them for the purpose of research,” and that the “law’s wording would probably
prohibit funding for work in a non-viable human embryo”). Because of the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment, research for genetic modification today may be pri-
vately but not publicly funded. As some commentators have noted, the public
“funding ban could . . . create a disincentive for private organizations to conduct
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mation for those who risk communicating diseases to their kin and
even though some countries, like the United Kingdom, have recently
lifted their bans against them to allow for limited applications in cases
involving deleterious mutations heritable by future generations.211
Various arguments have been advanced against these and other
reproductive technologies, and the designer baby critique underlies
most of them.212 Some argue that genetic modification compromises
human autonomy and interferes with children’s right to an open fu-
ture because it subjects them to a master plan that designs and pre-
embryo-based research, as such organizations may rely on public grants to con-
duct research.” Tandice Ossareh, Note, Would You Like Blue Eyes With That? A
Fundamental Right to Genetic Modification of Embryos, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 729,
745 (2017). Even assuming that private funding of research involving genetically
modified human embryos allows the processes used therein (CRISPR/Cas9, mito-
chondrial donation) to move to clinical trials, federal law could still frustrate
those trials’ success. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has regula-
tory jurisdiction over such trials since the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate tissue
transplantation, including the IVF procedure made necessary by genetic modifi-
cation, and to approve any application by a fertility specialist involving the trans-
fer and gestation of an edited human embryo. An omnibus spending bill provision
passed in December 2015, following a hearing on “the science and ethics of engi-
neered human DNA,” prevents the FDA from using any of its resources to even
consider an application to proceed with clinical trials involving germline modifi-
cation, thus effectively making clinical uses of germline modification, including
mitochondrial transfer, effectively impossible in the United States. See Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 § 749, 129 Stat. 2242, 2283
(2015). In 2017, the FDA sent a cease and desist letter to the U.S. doctor who
successfully created a child through mitochondrial donation, informing him that
he was in violation of federal law even though he performed the actual procedure
at one of his satellite offices in Mexico. See Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Direc-
tor, Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research, to Dr. John Zhang, PhD, MD (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
ComplianceActivities/Enforcement/UntitledLetters/UCM570225.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/8YAL-X2SM].
211. In February 2015, the House of Commons and the House of Lords passed legisla-
tion allowing for clinical trials of mitochondrial donation, which constitutes modi-
fication of the germline because it results in genetic changes that are passed onto
successive generations. The UK legislation permits mitochondrial donation under
the oversight of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), the
governmental body charged with regulating alternative reproductive technolo-
gies in the United Kingdom. See The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mito-
chondrial Donations) Regulations 2015, S 2015/572, http://www.legislation.gov
.uk/uksi/2015/572/contents/made [http://perma.unl.edu/YW4Q-CY8N] (UK legis-
lation via the National Archives (UK); I. Glenn Cohen et al., Transatlantic Les-
sons in Regulation of Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, 348 SCI. 178 (2015).
212. The following arguments represent the constellation of objections to these proce-
dures that are based in one way or another on designer baby concerns. Other
arguments to these procedures exist—including, most notably, arguments relat-
ing to their safety—but this Article is primarily concerned with the designer baby
critique given that it will linger even if, or when, scientists perfect gene editing in
a way that alleviates safety concerns.
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determines their life path.213 Others maintain that genetic modifica-
tion amounts to private or consumer-driven eugenics because it
shapes children in ways that reflect and reproduce dominant cultural
preferences and perpetuates inequalities between designed children
and their non-designed counterparts.214 Still others suggest that ge-
netic modification—and, for some critics, most forms of alternative re-
production—undermines the “ethic of giftedness” that parents ought
to cultivate toward their children because it encourages parents to
view their children as products to be curated rather than gifts to be
unconditionally embraced.215 On any of these accounts, genetic modi-
fication, whether to cure or to enhance, warrants concern as well as
prohibition even if scientists could guarantee its medical safety for
both the designed child and her descendants.
The most prominent exponent of the designer baby criticism that
continues to play a central role in arguments against certain ARTs is
Professor Michael Sandel,216 who has argued that reproductive choice
and enhancements of many kinds, from the market for eggs and sperm
to genetic modification of germline cells, “represent a kind of hyper-
agency, a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including human
nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires.”217
213. For a nice summary of these arguments, see David B. Resnik & Daniel B.
Vorhaus, Genetic Modification and Genetic Determinism, 1 PHIL. ETHICS
HUMANIT. MED. 9 (2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC15249
70/. Autonomy-based arguments against genetic modification are most often as-
sociated with Hans Jonas, Leon Kass, and Francis Fukuyama. See generally
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE (2003); HANS JONAS, THE IMPERA-
TIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHICS FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
(1985); LEON KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE (1985).
214. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 27, at 68 (noting that “[c]ritics of genetic engineering
argue that human cloning, enhancement, and the quest for designer children are
nothing more than ‘privatized’ or ‘free-market’ eugenics”); id. at 70 (arguing that
“there is something wrong with the ambition, be it individual or collective, to
determine the genetic characteristics of our progeny by deliberate design”); David
King, Editing the Human Genome Brings Us One Step Closer to Consumer Eugen-
ics, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/
aug/04/editing-human-genome-consumer-eugenics-designer-babies [https://per
ma.unl.edu/4XQG-8R2H]. For a critique of the eugenics critique of ART, see
DAAR, supra note 4, at 29 (arguing that “[c]asting the pursuit of reproductive
control during the American eugenics movement and the ART era as, respec-
tively, nefarious and technical defies both history and current practices”).
215. See SANDEL, supra note 27, at 26–27; THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 138, at 138.
216. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE COM-
MITTEE ON HUMAN GENE EDITING, HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS,
GOVERNANCE 157 (2017) (stating that “[t]he concern of the Bush-era commission
that germline enhancement might encourage people to view children as some-
thing to be designed and manipulated has long been a concern of some social
scientists and humanists” and identifying this position principally with Professor
Sandel).
217. SANDEL, supra note 27, at 26–27.
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“[P]rocreative practices that enable parents to pick and choose the
kind of children they will have,”218 Sandel writes, “miss[ ], and may
even destroy . . . an appreciation of the gifted character of human pow-
ers and achievements.”219 By “gifted character” and “ethic of gifted-
ness,” Sandel intends “the mystery of birth”220 over the “mastery”221
and deliberateness of reproductive design, “unpredictable[ness]”222
over foreseeability, “contingency”223 over certainty. Sandel’s designer
baby critique of genetic modification—most certainly to enhance, but
also to cure disease224—has surfaced in numerous other writings ad-
dressing the ethical dimensions of alternative reproduction, including
the President’s Council on Bioethics report on human cloning,225 Leon
218. Id. at 70
219. Id. at 27
220. Id. at 46
221. Id. at 83.
222. Id. at 45.
223. Id. at 91; see also id. at 82–83 (“Whatever its effect on the autonomy of the child,
the drive to banish contingency and to master the mystery of birth diminishes the
designing parent and corrupts parenting as a social practice governed by norms
of unconditional love.”).
224. Sandel appears to object to all efforts to genetically manipulate the human gen-
ome, whether for therapeutic or non-therapeutic reasons. See id. at 99 (arguing
that “the genetic revolution came, so to speak, to cure disease, but stayed to
tempt us with the prospect of enhancing our performance, designing our children,
and perfecting our nature” and also suggesting that “that may have the story
backward”). Other opponents of germline modification more explicitly stake their
opposition on slippery slope fears, arguing that “permitting even unambiguously
therapeutic interventions could start us down a path towards non-therapeutic
genetic enhancement.” Edward Lanphier et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line,
519 NATURE 410, 411 (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.nature.com/news/don-t-edit-
the-human-germ-line-1.17111 [https://perma.unl.edu/D7KN-87LC]; see also THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES ON SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE COMMITTEE OF
HUMAN GENE EDITING, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 216, at 128–30 (dis-
cussing slippery slope objections to human genome editing).
225. The Council unanimously held that federal law ought to prohibit reproductive
cloning; a minority of the Council, including Sandel, recommended that federal
law ought to permit, but regulate, cloning for therapeutic research purposes. See
THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY,
supra note 138, at 199–204. Today, federal law does not ban cloning (whether for
research or reproductive purposes) but does prohibit the use of federal funding in
cloning research under the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. See H.R. 2880, 104th
Cong. § 509(a) (1996); see also Russell A. Spivak et al., Germline Gene Editing
and Congressional Reaction in Context: Learning from Almost 50 Years of Con-
gressional Reactions to Biomedical Breakthroughs, 30 J.L. & HEALTH 20 (2017)
(discussing the amendment). The giftedness argument associated most closely
with Sandel appears throughout Human Cloning and Human Dignity. See THE
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra
note 138, at 7 (arguing that “[w]e treat [our children] rightly when we treat them
as gifts rather than as products”); id. at 97 (stating that cloning would “be an
experiment in human procreation—substituting asexual for sexual reproduction
and treating children not as gifts but as our self-designed products”); id. at
99–100 (stating that unlike a child that is sexually created, in procreation “as-
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Kass’s seminal article on human cloning,226 and more recent scholarly
and popular criticism of human genome editing227 and mitochondrial
donation.228
The designer baby critique of various forms of alternative repro-
duction is itself vulnerable to different criticisms,229 but this Article
focuses on just one of them: the fact that designer baby anxiety re-
flects and reinforces sexual supremacy, privileging as it does an ideal
vision of sexual procreation over non-sexual procreation.
At times this privileging is explicit, as when commentators argue
that non-sexual reproduction is morally objectionable because it de-
signs and manipulates reproduction and therefore lacks the presumed
attributes of sexual procreation, “an activity that is at once natural,
private, mysterious, unmediated, unpredictable, and undesigned.”230
“Procreation is not making but the outgrowth of doing,” the Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics writes.231 “A man and woman give them-
selves in love to each other, setting their projects aside in order to do
just that.”232 Leon Kass puts this in even more explicit terms in The
Wisdom of Repugnance, where he argues that “the severing of procrea-
tion from sex, love, and intimacy is inherently dehumanizing, no mat-
ter how good the product.”233 “Human societies virtually everywhere
sisted by human ingenuity (as with IVF) . . . it may become harder to see the child
solely as a gift bestowed upon the parents’ mutual self-giving and not to some
degree as a product of their parental wills”); id. at 106 (stating that
“[r]eproduction with the aid of . . . technologies [like IVF] still implicitly expresses
a willingness to accept as a gift the product of a process we do not control,” unlike
human reproductive cloning, which “begins with a very specific final product in
mind and would be tailored to produce that product”).
226. See Kass, supra note 138, at 22 (arguing that the clone’s “makers subvert the
cloned child’s independence, beginning with that aspect that comes from knowing
that one was an unbidden surprise, a gift, to the world, rather than the designed
result of someone’s artful project”).
227. For these arguments and their sources, see THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCI-
ENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN GENE EDITING,
HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 216, at 124–30, 156–59.
228. Olga Khazan, We’re Already Designing Babies, ATLANTIC (July 3, 2014), https://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/07/were-already-designing-babies/
373896/ [https://perma.unl.edu/3FJH-SY9A] (summarizing letters to the FDA de-
nouncing mitochondrial donation for being “in the same sci-fi realm as ‘designer
babies’”).
229. For these criticisms, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, BETTER THAN HUMAN: THE PROMISE
AND PERILS OF ENHANCING OURSELVES 148–91 (2011); Resnik & Vorhaus, supra
note 213, at 6–9.
230. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY,
supra note 138, at 9.
231. Id. at 99.
232. Id.
233. Kass, supra note 138, at 22. Kass’s critique applies primarily to cloning, the im-
mediate subject of his article, but is applicable as well to other forms of alterna-
tive reproduction. He says: “Human cloning would also represent a giant step
toward turning begetting into manufacture (literally, something ‘handmade’), a
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have structured child-rearing responsibilities and systems of identity
and relationship on the bas[is] of [the] deep natural facts of beget-
ting,”234 Kass writes—on the basis, in other words, of sexual coitus.
On this view, non-sexual reproduction is inferior to sexual reproduc-
tion because it designs children in ways that depart from a vision of
sexual procreation as “unpredictable,” “undesigned,” and “un-
mediated.”235 In so doing, non-sexual reproduction destabilizes iden-
tity, kinship, and even culture itself.236
At other times, designer baby arguments are a subtler and more
thinly-veiled valorization of sexual procreation. Consider once again
Sandel’s “ethic of giftedness” argument against designer children and
alternative reproduction. While Sandel does not explicitly say so, “gift-
edness” appears to be a feature of—and even a synecdoche for—sexual
procreation, as it is in certain religious traditions. Pope Francis’s 2016
apostolic exhortation, Amoris Laetitia, makes an obvious connection
between sexual procreation and giftedness when it urges that “[a]
child deserves to be born of [conjugal] love, and not by any other
means, for ‘he or she is not something owed to one, but is a gift,’ which
is ‘the fruit of the specific act of the conjugal love of the parents.’”237
Other Catholic writings similarly establish a connection between sex-
ual procreation and giftedness, with some asserting that a child is a
“gift” that has “the right . . . to be the fruit of ” sexual rather than
manipulated conception,238 and others expressing that “only the recip-
rocal gift of the married love of a man and a woman, expressed and
realized in the conjugal act . . . , is a worthy context for the coming
forth of a new human life.”239 Giftedness is associated with, and at
process already begun with in vitro fertilization and genetic testing of embryos.”
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 21.
235. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY,
supra note 138, at 9.
236. Kass, supra note 138, at 23.
237. POPE FRANCIS, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION, AMORIS LAETITIA 63
(2016), https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost_exhortations/docu-
ments/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20160319_amoris-laetitia_en.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/CF8F-XEVG]. The Amoris Laetitia elsewhere decries alternative
reproduction for its “ability to manipulate the reproductive act, making it inde-
pendent of the sexual relationship between a man and a woman,” and for not
receiving human creation “as a gift.” Id. at 45.
238. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR
HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION, http://www.vati-
can.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222
_respect-for-human-life_en.html [https://perma.unl.edu/68V3-Z6QU].
239. PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR LIFE, FINAL COMMUNIQUE ON “THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN
PROCREATION AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES. ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL
ASPECTS” (2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acd
life/documents/rc_pont-acd_life_doc_20040316_x-gen-assembly-final_en.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/Y89W-S35K].
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times a symbol of, sexual procreation in all of these writings, which,
like Sandel, decry ART and its impulse to design life.
In ways both explicit and implicit, then, the designer baby criti-
cism of alternative reproduction reflects the first aspect of sexual
supremacy as understood by this Article because it privileges and pri-
oritizes the “mysterious”240 and “unpredictable”241 process of sexual
procreation over the “designed”242 and “manipulated”243 process of
non-sexual reproduction. Just as marriage is the baseline for non-mar-
riage, and just as the sexual family is the metric or yardstick for the
non-sexual family, so too is the sexual procreative process the metric
or yardstick for the non-sexual procreative process. On this view, the
more that non-sexual procreation looks like sexual procreation or imi-
tates “the uncontrolled beginnings of human procreation,”244 the more
likely it can be accommodated by law and culture.245
In addition, the designer baby criticism of alternative reproduction
and its attendant technology reflects the second aspect of sexual
supremacy as understood by this Article because it asymmetrically ap-
plies the ideals associated with sexual procreation to non-sexual re-
production. Sexually-conceived children are regulated, controlled,
manipulated, and designed all the time both before and after birth in
ways that render them similar to, or at least not entirely dissimilar
from, the designer babies that fuel so much criticism of alternative
reproduction. And yet, designer baby critics rarely direct their same
critique of ART to sexual reproduction, rooted as that critique is in a
binaristic understanding of ART as designed and predictable, and sex-
ual procreation as undesigned and unpredictable.
Consider the selection and design process that takes place before
sexual reproduction. Charles Darwin famously argued that animals
and humans make choices, both conscious and unconscious, about
with whom to mate and reproduce based on secondary sex characteris-
240. SANDEL, supra note 27, at 46.
241. Id. at 45.
242. Id. at 75.
243. Id. at 61.
244. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY,
supra note 138, at 106.
245. The President’s Council on Bioethics ultimately rejected human cloning but not
IVF (at least entirely) precisely because, in its view, IVF adequately preserved
“the basic structure of sexual reproduction.” “The end served by IVF is still the
same as natural reproduction,” the Council writes, and “[r]eproduction with the
aid of such techniques still implicitly expresses a willingness to accept as a gift
the product of a process we do not control.” THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 138, at 16. Unlike
cloning, it notes, IVF bears enough of the attributes of sexual procreation to war-
rant recognition—it is “still unpredictable, and the genetic endowment of the
child remains uncontrolled and undesigned.” Id.
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tics like ornamental feathers and facial hair.246 He called this process
sexual selection, and argued in The Descent of Man, and Selection in
Relation to Sex that it was a “process by which the members of one
sex—often female—choose their mates on the basis of their own in-
nate preferences.”247
A full-length treatment of Darwin’s evolutionary theory of sexual
selection and its relationship to natural selection is well beyond the
scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, though, that Darwin argued, and
many biologists now agree,248 that sexual reproduction involves less
of the mystery and unpredictability so often attributed to it (by de-
signer baby critics, among others) and more of the choice, deliberation,
and design so often associated with alternative reproduction.249
Indeed, we do not even need Darwin’s theory of sexual selection (or
recent scientific proof of its accuracy) to know that humans engage in
designer reproduction all the time when they reproduce sexually. As
Steven Pinker observes in his critique of what he calls the “designer
baby myth”: “Anyone who has been turned down for a date has been a
victim of the human drive to exert control over half the genes of one’s
future children.”250 Professor Nita Farahany made a similar point at a
2014 Aspen Ideas Festival panel on “Should We Design Our Babies,”
noting that “[w]ho we choose as a potential mate—that’s selection
bias,”251 as did a recent Guardian piece addressing the eugenics criti-
cism of alternative reproduction and its alleged facilitation of an ethi-
cally problematic “gayby boom.”252 “If a straight woman in America
wants to choose a husband based on his race, height, or intelligence,
she can. It’s called dating,” the author observes.253 She continues:
“But if my future wife and I use the same criteria to select a white
sperm donor so my baby resembles me — I’m white — it’s called
eugenics.”254 Simply put, design is a feature of all reproduction, yet
one that commentators critical of designer reproduction selectively as-
sociate with the non-sexual reproductive process.
246. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX
245–311 (1871); RICHARD O. PRUM, THE EVOLUTION OF BEAUTY: HOW DARWIN’S
FORGOTTEN THEORY OF MATE CHOICE SHAPES THE ANIMAL WORLD—AND US 23–24
(2017) (describing Darwin’s theory).
247. PRUM, supra note 246, at 22 (describing Darwin’s theory).
248. See generally PRUM, supra note 246; EVELLEEN RICHARDS, DARWIN AND THE MAK-
ING OF SEXUAL SELECTION (2017).
249. See PRUM, supra note 246, at 5–6 (arguing that birds make “social and sexual
choices” that drive both reproduction and “avian evolution”).
250. Stephen [sic] Pinker, The Designer Baby Myth, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2003), https://
www.theguardian.com/education/2003/jun/05/research.highereducation [https://
perma.unl.edu/Z85U-SZVF].
251. Khazan, supra note 228 (summarizing Farahany’s remarks).
252. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
253. Id.
254. Id.
2018] AFTER SEX 51
Consider also the design of children that takes place after repro-
duction. Parents design and curate their children’s lives all the time—
and with increasing frequency and intensity among certain socioeco-
nomic cohorts255—and no commentator suspicious of designer repro-
duction has advocated for the regulation of that species of parental
oversight.256 To be sure, some critics of designer babies recognize the
designer impulse in many parents and denounce it for the same rea-
sons that they denounce reproductive design. Sandel, for instance, ac-
knowledges that “[i]mproving children through genetic engineering is
similar in spirit to the heavily managed, high-pressure child-rearing
practices that have become common these days,” continuing that “this
similarity does not vindicate genetic enhancement” but rather “high-
lights a problem with the trend toward hyperparenting.”257 He stops
short, however, in advocating for limitations of hyperparenting, choos-
ing instead to curtail parental design only when it occurs both before
birth and non-sexually. In this sense, non-sexual reproduction func-
tions as a sounding board for Sandel’s vision of ideal reproduction and
ideal parenting alike.258
Designer baby criticisms of alternative reproduction and its at-
tendant technology therefore use sexual procreation as a baseline for
non-sexual reproductive regulation, but sexual procreation as it is ide-
ally imagined rather than sexual procreation as it actually exists. As
such, these criticisms are of a piece with non-marriage regulation,
which subjects non-marriage to marital ideals that even married per-
sons need not satisfy. They also recall the ART regulations, actual and
proposed, considered so far by this Article. Those regulations, includ-
ing enacted surrogacy regulations and proposed regulations of gamete
donation, subject non-sexual reproduction to ideals about the tradi-
tional sexual family, but largely exempt the traditional sexual family
from those same ideals.
255. See Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221
(2011).
256. On this point, see June Carbone, Peer Commentary: In Vitro Gametogenesis: Just
Another Way to Have a Baby, 3 J.L. BIOSCI. 673, 678 (2016) (remarking that ob-
jections to gene editing on “designer parenting”/eugenic grounds fail to account
for the fact that “these risks are [not] fundamentally different from existing prac-
tices, such as intensive preschools or IQ testing, that may also produce and iden-
tify higher quality children”); Ossareh, supra note 210, at 762 (arguing that
“moral considerations may not be part of the calculation of the state’s interest in
a child’s well-being” when parents “pressure children into difficult, even danger-
ous situations” outside the ART context).
257. SANDEL, supra note 27, at 52.
258. The law often uses marginal kinship in this way—that is, as a sounding board for
its scripts and ideals about all kinship. See generally Cahill, Regulating at the
Margins, supra note 103.
52 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1
IV. AFTER SEX RECONSIDERED
Part III detailed the extent to which ideal sexual procreation re-
mains the organizing symbol for much of the law’s engagement with
non-sexual reproduction,259 just as ideal marriage remains the or-
ganizing symbol for much of the law’s engagement with non-mar-
riage.260 That it should do so should come as little surprise, as
essential family forms tend to persist in the law even as they are con-
tested, challenged, and updated. Indeed, sexual procreation has long
constituted the paradigm for its non-sexual counterpart, and so its
perseverance in contemporary ART regulation is in one sense alto-
gether predictable.261
259. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 1, at 53.
260. To be sure, in some important ways the law has abandoned sexual procreative
paradigms in its approach to alternative reproduction. A few states recognize “tri-
partite” or multiple parentage for ART children, see generally Carbone & Cahn,
supra note 23, and all states technically allow alternative insemination by single
women. Both of these things—poly-parenting and single parenting—challenge
and disrupt the norm fundamentally associated with the family that results from
sexual procreation. Even so, family law remains wedded to a paradigm of two
when it comes to parenting, prioritizing dyadic parenthood in statutes addressing
the parentage of children born to single women through alternative insemination
and in cases addressing the legal rights of individuals raising children created
through alternative reproduction. For instance, the law in many states is unclear
on the legal status of children born through alternative insemination to unmar-
ried and unpartnered women, who might very well share legal rights and respon-
sibilities over those children with the sperm donor, whether anonymous or
known. See NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2296 (observing
that under “the laws of many states, sperm donors are divested of rights and
responsibilities only if they donate sperm for use by a married woman”); id. at
2296 n.179 (remarking that in “only about fifteen states” the law “explicitly
provid[es] that a man who donates sperm to a woman who is not his wife is not
the child’s legal father”); Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Mar-
riage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption
and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006). In addition, as
shown above, law and culture exhibit lingering concerns over parentage that ex-
ceeds the paradigm of two—concerns that have surfaced in recent debates over
mitochondrial DNA transfer and its facilitation of a “three parent” baby. See
supra note 209 and accompanying text. As with the examples considered in the
previous Part, the law’s tentative embrace of single and polyadic parenthood in
the ART context suggests that sexual procreation and its associated family re-
main powerful models for legal engagements with non-sexual reproduction.
261. Consider in this regard Professor Gaia Bernstein’s account of the medical profes-
sion’s early attempts to preserve the presumed intimacy of sexual procreation in
its clinical approach to non-sexual procreation. Bernstein explains that some doc-
tors would have the recipient-wife’s husband administer the syringe during the
alternative insemination procedure in order to give the appearance that insemi-
nation was occurring sexually. Bernstein, supra note 30, at 1050. Her account
suggests that the law’s contemporary reliance on models relating to sexual pro-
creation when regulating non-sexual procreation is just the most recent manifes-
tation of cultural anxiety over reproductive mechanisms that “sever the tie
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Nevertheless, the persistence of sexual procreation in the law’s ap-
proach to non-sexual procreation unsettles and complicates many of
the claims summarized in Part II—claims like “ART represents the
banishment of sex from reproduction,”262 ART “disaggregat[es] sex
from reproduction,”263 and most of all, ARTs will soon facilitate the
“end of sex” and get us to a point after sex in intentional reproduc-
tion.264 Scholars like Greely are surely correct that the extraordinary
advances in reproductive medicine that have taken place in the last
two decades could help establish the conditions for the decline of sex-
ual procreation as the dominant vehicle for intentional human repro-
duction. The law, however, is likely to be more resistant, holding onto
norms relating to sexual procreation and the sexually-produced family
in its engagement with non-sexual reproduction.
Even more, the persistence of sexual procreation in the law’s ap-
proach to non-sexual procreation constrains the radical potential of
the technologies that could purportedly get us to a world after sex.
Consider in vitro gametogenesis, which involves the manufacture of
sex cells (egg and sperm cells) from something like skin cells. As men-
tioned earlier, in vitro gametogenesis could allow a same-sex male or
female couple to create a child genetically related to both members, a
single individual to effectively clone herself with gametes generated
from her own cells, or even three or more people to combine their ga-
metes to create a child.265 As such, it could enable the end of sex not
just as a reproductive activity but also as a marker of gender in repro-
duction because it could obviate the need for one person who is “XX”
and another who is “XY” to create—and join—gametes. Considering
that reproductive difference remains a constitutionally permissible
basis for the differential treatment of men and women across multiple
legal domains,266 the possibility that in vitro gametogenesis could
make gender less relevant in the reproductive process—and therefore
in the law more generally—is nothing short of astonishing.
A legal regime committed to sexual procreative paradigms in its
regulation of non-sexual reproduction, however, will likely frustrate
the radical potential of in vitro gametogenesis. Part III showed that
the law of surrogacy often molds the family created through surrogacy
in the image of the sexual family, stymieing the development of alter-
native family forms that could otherwise flourish under more permis-
sive surrogacy laws. The law could have a similar approach to newer
between sex and procreation” and threaten “the institute of the nuclear family.”
Id.
262. HANSON, supra note 11, at 37.
263. DAAR, supra note 4, at 2.
264. GREELY, supra note 7, at 1.
265. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
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reproductive technologies like in vitro gametogenesis, which, like sur-
rogacy, threatens to disrupt the nuclear family form associated with
sexual reproduction by enabling same-sex, single, and polyadic
parenting. If that is right, then the law’s commitment to sexual pro-
creative paradigms in alternative reproduction regulation could in-
hibit the very technology thought to permit sex’s dethroning in
intentional human reproduction.
Numerous other examples exist of this phenomenon—of the law’s
commitment to sexual procreative ideals in ART regulation frustrat-
ing the technological development and radical potential of ARTs. Mito-
chondrial DNA transfer holds the potential to transform reproduction
by allowing women to have children free of debilitating (and often fa-
tal) disease, but the law’s commitment to a sexual paradigm of “two”
in reproduction could hinder the development of that technology,
given its association with unnatural “three-parent babies.”267 Simi-
larly, genomic profiling and editing hold the potential to transform re-
production by allowing individuals and couples to screen out and even
alter embryos that are genetically predisposed to developing deleteri-
ous conditions. And yet, law and culture’s discomfort with overly con-
trolled, designed, and curated reproduction—their discomfort with
prospective parents “playing God,”268 tinkering with nature, and re-
sisting the “ethic of giftedness”269 so closely allied with sexual procre-
ation—will likely hinder the development of those ARTs, especially if
the law continues to prohibit clinical uses of them on designer baby
grounds.
The point here is that an account of the end of sex in intentional
human reproduction that focuses solely on the technology that could
facilitate it underestimates the extent to which the law remains wed-
ded to ideals about sexual procreation in its engagement with non-
sexual reproduction—making the end of sex as both the reproductive
norm and reproductive form improbable, at least in the near term.
Moreover, accounts of alternative reproduction that posit a clear dis-
tinction between sexual and non-sexual reproduction, or that assume
that ART disaggregates and liberates sex from reproduction, fail to
appreciate the many points of overlap between those two forms of fam-
ily formation—if not in fact, then certainly in law. As it has in the
past, sexual procreation is likely to remain the baseline for ART regu-
lation as well as the model for the way in which we think about repro-
duction and the family, necessitating something other than
technological ingenuity to imagine a reproductive and familial world
after sex.
267. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
268. SANDEL, supra note 27, at 76.
269. Id. at 45.
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V. AFTER SEX REIMAGINED
So far, this Article has offered a thicker descriptive account of the
regulatory relationship between sexual and non-sexual reproduction
than that which appears in the literature addressing it. Its goal in so
doing has been twofold: (1) to unsettle the claim that sex could soon
end in intentional reproduction as well as the related point that non-
sexual reproduction removes sex from the reproductive equation; and
(2) to suggest that the influence of sexual procreation on the regula-
tion of non-sexual reproduction could not only undercut procreative
and familial flourishing but also undermine the far-reaching potential
of the technologies that will purportedly lead to the end of sex in fam-
ily formation.
Taking now a more prescriptive turn, this final substantive Part
begins to imagine a reproductive and familial world after sex. It fo-
cuses not on the technology that could get us there, as others have, but
on the law—specifically, on constitutional law. Sexual supremacy
might constrain the development of ART, but constitutional norms re-
lating to procreation and the family ought to constrain sexual
supremacy.
This Part discusses some of those norms, including those that sug-
gest: (1) that the state may not privilege traditional sexual procreation
when regulating intimate and family life, including procreation; and
(2) that the state may not treat non-sexual procreation as a non-fun-
damental liberty interest by subjecting it to norms and ideals from
which sexual procreation is largely exempt. Both of these constitu-
tional norms cabin—or ought to cabin—sexual supremacy’s reach,
making it possible to imagine the end of sex’s dominance in American
kinship.
A. Sexual Supremacy Unconstitutionally Privileges
Heterosexual Procreation
Sexual supremacy in ART regulation involves the official endorse-
ment of sexual procreation and the sexually-produced family. As such,
it is in tension with the decline of sexual supremacy in the regulation
of sexual relationships and marriage. The demise of sexual supremacy
in contemporary constitutional law begins with Lawrence v. Texas,270
a case that is less about the state’s privileging of sexual procreation
(at least directly) and more about the state’s privileging of procreative
270. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Earlier cases protecting non-procreative sex of course began
this demise—see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a right to marital pri-
vacy which includes a married couple’s decision to use birth control)—but this
Article centers on sexual supremacy in the twenty-first century.
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sex—the flipside or other face of sexual supremacy as understood by
this Article.271
Lawrence struck down Texas’s law criminalizing sex between indi-
viduals of the same sex and expanded the constitutional right of sex-
ual autonomy to include non-procreative sex. Lawrence also suggested
that it was unconstitutional for the state to privilege a particular idea
(and ideal) of sex through the operation of the criminal law, cautioning
that the Constitution prohibits the state from “defin[ing] the meaning
of [a sexual relationship] or [setting] its boundaries.”272 Rejecting the
Supreme Court’s earlier contention in Bowers v. Hardwick that consti-
tutional protection for sex was contingent on whether sex satisfied the
state’s preferred vision of that act—coital and procreative273—Law-
rence declared that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and
it is not correct today.”274
Where Lawrence rejected sexual supremacy as the privileging of
procreative sex in sexual regulation, more recent Supreme Court ju-
risprudence has rejected sexual supremacy as the privileging of sexual
procreation in marriage regulation. Of particular importance in this
regard is Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court’s 2015 marriage equality de-
cision finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses protect a right to marry for same-sex
couples.275 For decades, states justified exclusionary marriage laws on
the basis of sexual procreation, contending that such laws promoted
an interest in traditional sexual reproduction.276 Amicus briefs filed
in the dozens of marriage equality cases across the United States—
including in Obergefell—echoed this position, arguing that exclusion-
ary marriage laws furthered the state’s interest in championing both
heterosexual procreation and its social expression in the form of the
traditional nuclear family.277
A marriage brief filed by Sherif Girgis, Robert George, and Ryan
Anderson, longstanding (and ongoing) opponents of same-sex mar-
riage and same-sex parenthood, here illustrates.278 Defending the
271. That is, before Lawrence v. Texas, states could legitimately privilege procreative
sex. The question after Lawrence is whether the state can legitimately privilege
sexual procreation.
272. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
273. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
274. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
275. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
276. For a more complete analysis of sexual procreation’s role in sustaining exclusion-
ary marriage laws, see Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived, supra note 2, at 671–81.
277. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 83
(2013).
278. Brief of Robert P. George, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Hollingsworth and
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting Rever-
sal, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013), United States v. Windsor, 570
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governments’ non-recognition of same-sex marriage solely on the basis
of the physical act of heterosexual procreation, Girgis, George, and
Anderson wrote:
First, marriage unites persons in their bodies as well as their minds. The
bodily union of two people is much like the bodily union of organs in an indi-
vidual. Just as one’s organs form a unity by coordinating for the biological
good of the whole (one’s survival), so the bodies of a man and a woman form a
unity by coordination (coitus) for a biological good (reproduction) of their
union as a whole. In choosing such biological coordination, spouses unite bod-
ily, and do not merely touch or interlock, in a way that has generative signifi-
cance. This generative kind of act physically embodies their specific, marital
commitment. Non-marital bonds are, by contrast, unions of hearts and minds,
but not bodies.
Second, marriage is oriented to procreation, family life, and thus a compre-
hensive range of goods. Why? The kind of act that makes marital love is also
the one that makes new life: new participants in every type of good.279
The Girgis-George-Anderson position, which was endorsed by states
in the form of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibi-
tions, posits that traditional coitus is a necessary condition of the con-
stitutional right to marry, just as traditional coitus before Lawrence
was a necessary condition of the constitutional right to sex. It relies
not just on the belief that male/female biological difference shapes the
social relations of parenthood,280 as Professor NeJaime has noted, but
that male/female sexual procreation specifically shapes those rela-
tions—indeed, shapes “every type of good” imaginable.281 NeJaime
has identified many instances where courts “collapse” the “biological
aspects of reproduction [into] . . . the social aspects of parenting” when
considering the legal rights of people using ART to procreate.282 The
Girgis-George-Anderson brief elides or collapses not just the biological
and the social but the sexual and the social. It contends not just that
dual gender biology matters for parenting but that sexual procreation
specifically matters for parenting.
In rejecting the notion that the constitutional right to marry is con-
ditioned not just on the ability to procreate but on the ability to procre-
ate sexually, the Obergefell Court finally rejected the role of sexual
supremacy in marriage regulation. Significantly, Obergefell not only
U.S. 744 (2013) (Nos. 12-144, 12-307), 2013 WL 390984. Ryan Anderson filed a
brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the case recently decided by the Supreme Court
that pits equality against the free speech and free exercise of religion rights of a
commercial vendor. Anderson there makes many of these same arguments with
respect to “conjugal” marriage, albeit in the First Amendment context. See Brief
of Ryan T. Anderson, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, 13,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 2016 WL
1645027 (Colo. 2016) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004529.
279. Brief of Robert P. George, et al., supra note 278, at 8.
280. NeJaime, supra note 277, at 93.
281. Brief of Robert P. George, et al., supra note 278, at 8 (emphasis added).
282. NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2295.
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repudiated the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibi-
tions283 but also recognized that same-sex couples throughout the
United States could procreate and were procreating with each other to
create “biological” children—presumably through alternative repro-
ductive technologies that make biological parenthood for same-sex
couples possible.284 In so doing, Obergefell made clear that sexual
supremacy—understood as the official valorization of traditional sex-
ual procreation and the sexually-produced family—was no longer a
sustainable basis for large swaths of intimate life.285
Even more, Obergefell could be read to stand for the proposition
that the Constitution rejects sexual supremacy not just in the law of
marriage but also in the law of procreation. While obviously a case
about marriage equality between same-sex and opposite-sex couples,
Obergefell is also—between the lines or beneath the surface—a case
about procreation equality between sexual and non-sexual procrea-
tion. Several times throughout its opinion the majority refers to mar-
riage and procreation as “related rights” that compose a “unified
whole,”286 linking not marriage and procreation as acts (as some
states had hoped) but marriage and procreation as vigorously pro-
tected rights. In so doing, the Court at the very least suggests that it is
no more constitutional for the state to endorse a particular vision of
sexual procreation through its regulation of procreation than it is for
the state to endorse a particular vision of sexual procreation through
its regulation of marriage.
The Supreme Court’s banishment of various forms of sexual
supremacy in sexual, marital, and even, perhaps, procreative regula-
tion destabilizes much of the regulation, actual and proposed, dis-
cussed in Part III of this Article. Part III showed that the law
regulates the family created through ART in the shadow of the sexual
family, much as the law regulates non-marriage in the shadow of mar-
riage. Ideals about sexual procreation and the sexually-produced fam-
ily influence surrogacy regulations, privileging as they do core
features of traditional sexual procreation, like biology, marriage, and
gender. Ideals about sexual procreation and the sexually-produced
family influence the “raging” contemporary debate over anonymous
egg and sperm donation,287 whose abolition commentators support on
the ground that anonymous donation departs too dramatically from
the norms surrounding the sexual, biological family. Finally, ideals
283. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
284. Id. at 2600.
285. Chief Justice Roberts hewed to sexual supremacy in his vision of marriage that
emerges from his Obergefell dissent. See id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(stating that marriage exclusions are constitutional because of procreation, and
“[p]rocreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and a woman”).
286. Id. at 2600.
287. Cohen, supra note 22, at 527.
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about sexual procreation influence much of the debate over develop-
ments in reproductive medicine that have the capacity to revolutionize
reproduction, parenthood, and even gender. Those developments in-
clude gene editing and mitochondrial DNA transfer, each of which os-
tensibly designs children in ways that undermine the presumed
qualities of sexual procreation and its celebrated ethic of giftedness.
Many of these concerns animated the criminalization of same-sex
intimacy and the prohibition of same-sex marriage not too long ago,
and they have drifted and shifted, virus-like, into the alternative re-
production setting, where they have taken root to resist the expansion
of non-sexual reproduction beyond sexual procreative paradigms.
Their continued presence in that context raises constitutional concern
in light of the explicit rejection of sexual supremacy in domains, like
sex and marriage, which are co-extensive with procreation and family
formation. If sexual supremacy is an inadequate basis for the regula-
tion of an institution like marriage, then it is hard to imagine that
sexual supremacy would remain an adequate basis for the legal regu-
lation of procreation—something much more private, prior, and
rudimentary.
B. Sexual Supremacy Incorrectly Assumes That Non-Sexual
Procreation Is a Non-Fundamental Right
Sexual supremacy involves two interrelated aspects: the regulation
of non-sexual reproduction according to paradigms about sexual pro-
creation and the sexually-produced family, and the asymmetrical or
selective application of those paradigms to non-sexual reproduction.
The first aspect of sexual supremacy is unconstitutional for the rea-
sons discussed in section V.A. The second aspect of sexual supremacy
is unconstitutional for a different reason: because it assumes without
adequate explanation that non-sexual reproduction is a non-funda-
mental liberty interest.
Examples abound of the uneven application of ideals about sexual
procreation to non-sexual procreation, and Part III showcased many of
them. Surrogacy laws apply norms associated with ideal sexual pro-
creation—marriage, dual-gender parenting, and mothering—to non-
sexual procreation, and only to non-sexual procreation. Proposals to
eliminate egg and sperm donor anonymity apply norms associated
with ideal sexual procreation—biological affinity, transparency—to
non-sexual procreation, and only to non-sexual procreation. Designer
baby criticisms of ART apply norms associated with ideal sexual pro-
creation—chance, unpredictability, giftedness—to non-sexual procre-
ation, and only to non-sexual procreation. Each of these examples
follows a predictable pattern: the fashioning of non-traditional procre-
ation in the shadow of sexual procreation not as it actually exists, but
as it ideally exists. It is a pattern that characterizes the law’s ap-
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proach to non-traditional kinship generally—witness non-marriage
regulation, as discussed earlier288—and it rests on an assumption
that non-traditional kinship receives less constitutional protection
than its traditional counterpart.
Most often, this assumption is implicit in the context of proposed
and actual regulations of ART. For example, Sandel acknowledges
that many parents engage in designer parenting, but then supports
regulating that practice only when it occurs in the ART setting, thus
implying that the state may selectively target ART for designer baby
reasons.289 Sometimes, though, the assumption that ART implicates
less robust constitutional interests is explicit. For example, Professor
Naomi Cahn supports mandatory identification of paternity in the
context of alternative insemination but not in the context of sexual
reproduction on the express ground that sexual and non-sexual repro-
duction “are, in fact, different, and different enough to satisfy any
level of constitutional scrutiny.”290 Sandel, Cahn, and other scholars
are not alone in their rejection of ART as a fundamental right, as some
courts have also rejected the notion that certain ARTs implicate the
fundamental right to procreate.291 New York’s Task Force on Life and
Law recently did the same, concluding in its 2017 surrogacy report
that “individuals do not have a fundamental right to surrogacy.”292
The notion that procreation is vigorously protected under the Con-
stitution only when it occurs sexually is in tension with emerging ju-
risprudence on the constitutional status of ART. Most significant in
288. See generally Cahill, Regulating at the Margins, supra note 103 (exploring this
phenomenon in domestic partnership and de facto parent regulation); Baker,
supra note 124 (exploring this phenomenon in de facto parent regulation); Hunt-
ington, supra note 124 (exploring this phenomenon in family law generally).
289. SANDEL, supra note 27, at 52.
290. Cahn, supra note 29, at 1106.
291. See, e.g., In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 419 N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 46, 57 (2011) (concluding that a non-biological intended mother to a surro-
gacy agreement lacks a “fundamental right” to be the legal parent of a child ges-
tated by a third-party and created with a donor egg “because of the absence of any
biological or gestational connection to the child”). But see D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129
So. 3d 320, 338 (Fla. 2013) (suggesting that non-sexual reproduction might be
integral to the right to procreate in light of “advances in science and technology
[that] now provide innumerable ways for traditional and non-traditional couples
alike to conceive a child”). Scholars have long debated whether the Constitution
protects a fundamental right to procreate that includes non-sexual reproduction.
See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the
Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490 (2008) (finding a
fundamental right to reproduce non-sexually); Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: As-
sisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1457 (2008) (arguing that the Constitution does not protect a fundamental
right to procreate, let alone a fundamental right to procreate non-sexually).
292. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW, REVISITING SURROGATE PARENT-
ING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ON GESTATIONAL SUR-
ROGACY 51 (Dec. 19, 2017).
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this regard is the Supreme Court’s recent marriage jurisprudence,
which points strongly in the direction of finding that non-sexual pro-
creation is a fundamental right. As noted in section V.A, Obergefell v.
Hodges places marriage and procreation on the same constitutional
plane by referring to them more than once as “related rights” that
compose a “unified whole.”293 Obergefell also rejects states’ attempts
to define marriage in narrow terms as the right to same-sex mar-
riage.294 It follows that if marriage and procreation are “related
rights,” and if it is unconstitutional to define marriage in narrow
terms, then it is also unconstitutional to define procreation in narrow
terms.295 In addition, Obergefell implicitly rejects the contention that
sex is necessary for the right to procreate by repudiating the procrea-
tion rationale for marriage laws and by overruling Baker v. Nelson,296
both of which, I have elsewhere argued, conditioned the right to marry
on sexual procreation specifically.297
Other courts have similarly suggested that non-sexual procreation
might be a fundamental liberty interest under state constitutions. For
instance, in its landmark “two mom” case, the Florida Supreme Court
observed that “advances in science and technology now provide innu-
merable ways for traditional and non-traditional couples alike to con-
ceive a child” and thereby “exercise their inalienable rights to enjoy
and defend life,” which are guaranteed by the Florida Constitution.298
The lower court in that case made a similar observation when it rea-
soned that “[t]o suggest that procreative rights do not encompass the
use of medical technology ignores the fact that the right not to procre-
ate through the use of contraception and the right to terminate a preg-
nancy necessarily require access to medical technology and
assistance.”299 In so doing, the lower court rejected the dissenting
judge’s contention that Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court case
that established a right to procreate,300 was limited to “natural pro-
293. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
294. Id. at 2602.
295. NeJaime argues that Obergefell could eventually lead courts to “extend due pro-
cess protection” to non-biological parents who maintain “social bonds” with chil-
dren created through alternative reproduction. NeJaime, The Nature of
Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2358–59.
296. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting a federal constitutional challenge to Min-
nesota’s opposite-sex marriage requirement in part because of procreation, over-
ruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
297. See Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived, supra note 2, at 677–79.
298. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 338 (Fla. 2013).
299. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
300. Skinner struck down Oklahoma’s mandatory sterilization law under the federal
Equal Protection Clause and suggested that procreation was a fundamental
right. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The dissent in T.M.H. cited
Skinner for the proposition that the right to procreate protected only sexual pro-
creation. See T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 818 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
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creation (which involves both private, intimate, sexual contact be-
tween consenting adults and the control of one’s own body).”301
This emerging jurisprudence on the right to procreate and its outer
limits could render vulnerable the selective burdening of non-sexual
reproduction with ideals and norms about procreation and parenting
more generally—the second aspect of sexual supremacy discussed by
this Article. By way of example, consider once again the procreation
rationale for exclusionary marriage laws. As some courts have recog-
nized, that rationale reflected a normative ideal about all marriage
that states were selectively applying to same-sex couples.302 In re-
sponse to the argument that the procreation rationale unfairly
targeted same-sex couples with the ideal of procreative marriage,
courts maintained that states could do so because same-sex marriage,
unlike opposite-sex marriage, was not a fundamental right.303 As Jus-
tice Scalia quipped during oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry in
reference to Justice Kagan’s point that procreation was an underinclu-
sive rationale for marriage exclusions: “I suppose we could have a
questionnaire at the marriage desk when people come in to get the
marriage license – you know, ‘Are you fertile or are you not fertile?’ I
suppose this Court would find that to be an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy, don’t you think?”304 In this sense, same-sex couples (exer-
cising a non-fundamental right) were burdened with a marital ideal
from which married persons were actually exempt, much in the same
way that non-sexual procreators (exercising a purportedly non-funda-
mental right) are burdened with procreative ideals from which sexual
procreators are exempt.
The selective burdening of same-sex relationships with the states’
normative ideal about procreative marriage changed, of course, once
the Obergefell Court found that same-sex marriage was a fundamen-
tal right. In a world where same-sex marriage is not a fundamental
right, it is permissible to use same-sex couples as a vehicle to commu-
nicate the states’ ideal about all marriage. In a world where same-sex
marriage is fundamentally protected, however, the gross underin-
301. See T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 818 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
302. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1002 (Mass. 2003)
(Cordy, J., dissenting) (“As long as marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples
who can at least theoretically procreate, society is able to communicate a consis-
tent message to its citizens that marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of
their procreative endeavor . . . .” (emphasis added)).
303. Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
304. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013)
(No. 12-144).
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clusivity of the states’ normative aspirations for all marriage cannot
pass constitutional muster.305
So too here. The more likely it is that non-sexual procreation is a
fundamental right, the less likely it is that the selective burdening of
non-sexual procreation with the states’ ideals about all procreation
passes constitutional muster. The dissenting judge in the Florida case
mentioned above suggested as much when faulting the majority for
allegedly inventing a fundamental right to assisted reproduction that
would cast into doubt a range of state surrogacy requirements, includ-
ing the marriage requirement in Florida and elsewhere. “I do not see
how any of the restrictions on the use of assisted reproductive technol-
ogy, enacted by other states, could survive a constitutional challenge if
procreation using assisted reproductive technology is recognized as a
fundamental right,” he observed.306 Depending on how a fundamental
right to assisted reproduction is framed and what it includes, he might
be right.
The larger point here is that regulating non-sexual reproduction in
the shadow of ideals about sexual reproduction is in tension with non-
sexual reproduction’s fundamental right status, which cannot tolerate
the underinclusivity associated with sexual supremacy. The law even-
tually rejected the procreation rationale as orthogonal to marriage’s
deep purpose, and it ought to do the same with the similarly asymmet-
ric norms so often applied to non-sexual reproduction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even as society transitions to a point where sexual procreation is
not the only, nor even in time the dominant, method of family forma-
tion, sexual procreation is likely to remain the vehicle through which
the law’s ideas and ideals about reproduction, parenting, and the fam-
ily are routed. Professor Clare Huntington has argued that “the mari-
tal family serves as a . . . synecdoche for all families, not only
marginalizing non-marital families but also actively undermining
their already tenuous bonds.”307 A similar dynamic marks the law’s
engagement with non-sexual reproduction.
In that context, sexual procreation and the sexual family often
serve as “synecdoches” for all reproduction and for all families,
marginalizing and undermining non-traditional family formation and
non-normative family arrangements. Sometimes, the ideal sexual pro-
creative family—biological, gendered, and marital—is the synecdoche
305. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (rejecting procreation on un-
derinclusiveness grounds).
306. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Lawson, J.,
dissenting).
307. Huntington, supra note 103, at 167.
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for the family that results from non-sexual procreation. Other times,
the ideal sexual procreative process—mysterious, unpredictable, un-
designed—is the synecdoche for the non-sexual procreative process.
Either way, the law is more willing to accommodate and recognize
non-sexual procreation the more that it looks like ideal sexual procre-
ation and the family that results therefrom, a phenomenon that this
Article calls sexual supremacy.
Sexual supremacy’s shaping of contemporary ART law and policy
is not surprising. The law has “carr[ied] forward”308 the past in the
law of marriage and parenthood, and there is no reason to think that
the law of procreation would be any different. Sexual supremacy’s
shaping of contemporary ART law and policy is, however, deserving of
criticism. Sexual supremacy inhibits technology and its radical poten-
tial, making the end of sexual procreation’s dominance as both norm
and form difficult to envision. Its power over ART regulation ulti-
mately makes technology alone insufficient to guarantee a world after
sex in reproduction, necessitating something beyond innovation to dis-
place sex as the “central symbol”309 of American family law and Amer-
ican family life. One possibility suggested by this Article is existing
and emerging constitutional law relating to intimate and family life.
That law not only increasingly favors familial and procreative flour-
ishing apart from sex, but also destabilizes sexual supremacy’s norma-
tive foundations—in sex, marriage, and procreation alike.
308. NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, supra note 2, at 2289 (“Parentage law con-
tinues to draw distinctions that carry forward legacies of inequality embedded in
frameworks forged in earlier eras.”).
309. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 1, at 37.
